The New Democracy government, under the leadership of prime minister <a>Kyriakos Mitsotakis</a>, is facing the most serious political crisis since it came to power after the defeat of the SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) government in the elections of 2019.
Revelations about the National Intelligence Service (EYP) tapping the phones of the government’s political opponents, as well as of independent journalists, purportedly for “national security” reasons, is a big political scandal which will no doubt have serious political consequences.
At the root of this scandal is a culture of secrecy at the core of the bourgeois state, particularly in the field of “counter-terrorism” and espionage, which is the traditional domain of the notorious EYP, an opaque state service which has long enjoyed generous funding and total “protection” by governments of all political stripes—including that of SYRIZA.
The secrecy has two dimensions. On the one hand, there is the cooperation between the state and the private sector, with “security” enterprises that provide illegal and uncontrollable spyware. On the other hand, this elaborate surveillance (which provides obvious opportunities for blackmail) was placed under the direct control of Kyriakos Mitsotakis and his entourage, without even the pretext that this activity is undertaken for any broader social benefit. 
After coming to power, Mitsotakis, who is the prominent leader of the ultra-neoliberal faction of New Democracy, placed the control of EYP directly under the prime minister’s office. He appointed Panagiotis Kontoleon as head of the EYP, a man of the market who has a background in security companies. In doing so, he broke with a long tradition of the head of the EYP being a distinguished “statesman”, usually a career diplomat or equivalent. In addition, Mitsotakis assigned the “coordination” of the prime minister’s office (which now included the political direction of EYP) to his nephew, Grigoris Dimitriadis. Dimitriadis is a young free marketeer, who had already discredited himself in past scandals and scams (especially in the energy sector).
The scale of the surveillance is significant. In 2021, the number of officially approved phone-tappings reached 15,475, always supposedly for “national security” reasons. We should keep in mind that the actual figure is much higher, since EYP maintains the privilege to decide whether they want to track all the interlocutors of each “suspect” whose surveillance was “authorised”. All those people found themselves (for reasons of “national security”) in a situation without democratic rights or constitutional guarantees. In the process of surveillance, a specific “hub” in EYP used the Predator spyware, which is provided for hire by Intellexa, an Israeli surveillance firm. It is no coincidence that Intellexa is rumoured to have financial links with the prime minister’s nephew and coordinator of the government, the young lawyer, Grigoris Dimitriadis!
The first crack in this sinister structure emerged when it was found that EYP had installed the Predator spyware in the mobile phone of a journalist, Thanasis Koukakis, who was investigating financial scandals of the previous period (including a law by the Mitsotakis government that “released” certain big bank accounts which were previously “blocked” as suspects for money laundering). The crack became a rift when it was revealed that EYP had wire-tapped the mobile phone of parliamentarian Nikos Androulakis, while he was running for the leadership of PASOK (the Greek equivalent of the Labour Party).
Androulakis comfortably won the party election and is the current leader of PASOK mostly because (unlike his rival Andreas Loverdos) he refused to commit to forming a coalition with Mitsotakis in case New Democracy needed parliamentary support to rule after the next election. The motive for a potential political blackmail of Androulakis is more than obvious.
In the political storm that followed the revelations, even the extremely pro-government publications could no longer provide cover for Mitsotakis. “Kathimerini” (a paper owned by ship-owner Alafouzos) revealed that there are at least seven or eight more political opponents of Mitsotakis who are under surveillance. Christos Spirtzis (former minister and a right-hand man of SYRIZA leader Alexis Tsipras) has already said that Predator spyware was installed in his mobile phone. “To Vima” (a paper owned by ship-owner V. Marinakis) revealed that Intellexa is providing the Predator spyware for rent to more than 30 customers in Greece, beyond EYP and other state authorities. So it seems that business groups, banks, funds and others are engaged in the sport of illegal surveillance (the cost to rent Predator or other spyware is said to be €8 million per “target”).
Under the weight of these revelations, Mitsotakis was forced to ask for the resignations of Kontoleon and Dimitriadis, blaming them for “operational misfires”. But in the parliamentary debate, he tried to defend surveillance and the activities of EYP and to block any further investigations by invoking the “classified” character of counter-terrorism and espionage operations. His sister, Dora Bakoyannis, has publicly warned those involved to keep their mouths shut, declaring that whoever breaches the security of “classified” information faces 10 years in prison.
To justify this outrage, Mitsotakis is painting a picture of Greece as in a state of war: he constantly refers to the threat of immigrant or refugee “invasions”, and to some sort of “hybrid” threats coming from Turkey. Yet again, it is demonstrated that racism and nationalism have repercussions not only for migrants, but for the democratic rights of the majority as well. For everyone sees that if Mitsotakis won’t hesitate to cross a line against the head of a mainstream party of government like PASOK, then what hope is there for militant unionists, social movement activists or members of the political Left?
The failure of the government to present a convincing case for its actions in the face of the surveillance scandal has highlighted the difficulties that Mitsotakis is facing even in his own party, as well as his effort to remain the head of the wider “anti-Left” block which was formed during the struggles of 2010-15 (roughly defined as the political block that represented the “YES” vote in the referendum of 2015 about whether or not to accept the European Commission’s conditions for a bailout of the Greek economy). Former prime minister and ex-leader of New Democracy, Kostas Karamanlis, is a member of the powerful family that traditionally leads a fraction of the party known as “popular Right”. Ever since Mitsotakis was elected as party leader, Karamanlis opted for the tactic of remaining completely silent. He recently reversed this tactic for the first time, asking for the full investigation of the scandal and warning that it is not politically acceptable to invoke the “classified” nature of security service operations as a means to bypass parliamentary control and constitutional procedures.
This was also the political argument of former social democrats who represent the “extreme centre” in Greece, like Evaggelos Venizelos, Anna Diamantopoulou and N. Alivizatos. Since 2013, this political milieu had been a valuable ally for the right-wing party and a useful “reserve” for Mitsotakis in anticipation of the tough electoral contest in spring of 2023.
Important as it is in its own right, the surveillance scandal is not enough to explain these shifts. While they might seem minor now, they threaten the cohesion of the political current that enabled the electoral victory of the right wing in 2019. The scandal is also not enough to explain the changing treatment of Mitsotakis at an international level: major international publications and media support the revelations and the further investigation, while New Democracy politicians are under serious pressure in the institutions of the European Union.
Underpinning these developments is the failure of the economic and social policy of Mitsotakis, which is leading to a potential new and deep social and political crisis in Greece. Speaking at the International Fair in Thessaloniki, Mitsotakis chose to remind the ruling class how dedicated he was to serving their interests: he reduced the taxation on profits to a minimum, he drastically cut the employers’ social security contributions, he eliminated any control or taxation to the inheritance transfer of large fortunes, and most importantly, he insisted on the liberalisation of industrial relations and the reactionary reform of labour laws to make strike action and union organising harder. This policy produced certain results—despite the troubles in the international economy, Greek companies listed on the stock exchange can claim significant profits, the exports of Greek capitalism are breaking record after record, the income from tourism remain on very high levels, and the war in Ukraine has provided Greek ship-owners with new great opportunities (both legal and not-so-legal) to transport both American liquid natural gas and Russian oil.
But for workers and the poor, the situation is one of despair. According to estimates from unions, during 2022 the average wage of a full-time worker lost 19.2 percent of its purchasing power. Moving lower down the income ladder, where people have to spend all their income just to cover their immediate needs, the impact of inflation is even harsher. The average wage of a part-time worker declined 30 percent in real terms in 2022. In Greece, 30 percent of working-class households spend 45 percent of their monthly income on rent and utilities bills.
This extreme escalation of social inequality is creating concern even in conservative circles of the establishment. The idea that broader ruling coalitions will be needed to secure a social consensus is becoming more common in the mainstream press.
This is combined with a certain level of European discomfort about the situation. European “solidarity” funds are provided to Greece in order to protect the integrity of the system as a whole. The European Commission and its institutions are not happy to sit and watch in silence as the clique around Mitsotakis organises a “party” of one-sided distributions that benefit solely the prime minister’s cronies.
For the time being, the leadership of New Democracy maintains the control of the political situation, choosing to organise an election towards the end of the four-year term of Mitsotakis, in the spring of 2023. But no one can be sure that Mitsotakis will be in a better position by then, or even that his government will last that long. Especially since a tough winter is coming.
Opinion polls published after the surveillance scandal point towards the possibility of deadlock in the 2023 election. If correct, they indicate that the prospect of a parliamentary majority for New Democracy is no longer feasible. The prospect of a governmental coalition between New Democracy and PASOK does exist in terms of numbers, but it is no longer politically viable, after the breakdown in the relations of Mitsotakis with the current leadership of PASOK and also with other social-democratic politicians, who had until recently been more willing. The polls also show that the possibility of a coalition between SYRIZA and PASOK could work in terms of electoral numbers, but it too faces some important political problems. The statement of PASOK leader Nikos Androulakis that his aim is the formation of a government under “Neither Mitsotakis, Nor Tsipras” is an indication.
The remaining possibilities—either of a Grand Coalition (ND-SYRIZA), a technocratic government or an overhaul of the major political parties and the emergence of “new and unscathed leaderships”—are nebulous, without concrete steps having been taken in that direction.
This picture of the political situation, without a clear answer to the central question of governmental power in the next six to nine months, is a sign of the political instability affecting the country. Instability that could well increase as the surveillance scandal unfolds. Ultimately, the fate of Mitsotakis, and his ability to retain control of the political game, depends on the weakness of the opposition, and especially of SYRIZA.
The position of Tsipras is undermined by the record of his government in 2015-19. Details of the EYP’s activities that have become public because of the scandal indicate that the first pronounced increase in the number of phone-tappings took place in 2016, a time when Tsipras had to deal with imposing the Third Memorandum and the recent split in SYRIZA. In addition, the negotiations between the Greek state and Intellexa—which brought Predator spyware to the country—started in 2016, thus paving the way for the current outrages by Dimitriadis and his friends. But the position of Tsipras is even more compromised by the political strategy he chose for SYRIZA, a strategy which is totally “institutional”, adjusted to the needs to ally with the social-democratic party and the prospect of a “progressive” government, that is, a strategy which revolves solely around elections.
While Mitsotakis was speaking in Thessaloniki, Tsipras was a speaker at the annual festival of SYRIZA’s youth, addressing the most radical audience left in this party. The only thing he chose to say to the young people in the party ranks was a call to vote, whenever elections happen.
This policy provides Mitsotakis with a chance to survive. Worse, it provides the establishment the opportunity to move the political axis in a conservative direction, as they search for an electoral/governmental alternative solution after the election.
Facing a rough winter, the crucial question is whether the working-class movement and the youth will find the strength to assert their own independent will from below. This will both determine whether or not they can win their demands in the face of the crisis, as well as potentially impact the wider political situation. 
Translated by Panos Petrou. First published at <a href="https://internationalsocialism.net/greece-a-dangerous-government-clinging-to-power-by-any-means/">International Socialism Project</a>.

Antonis Davanellos

A dangerous government in Greece

The current political situation in Greece is full of contradictions. It is a political moment where everyone—from the top of society to the bottom—understands that the status quo is not sustainable and they must prepare for drastic change.
I feel compelled to begin by mentioning an important working-class victory, which came at a time when it was more needed than ever. It was at a workplace characterised by extreme “flexibilisation” of labour—a company named E-Food—which started as an electronic “platform” for selling and delivering food as well as other products.
E-Food grew enormously during the pandemic and the lockdowns, employing 3,000 workers (on “flexible” or temporary three-month contracts) and making significant profits. The company realised that the new labour law (which is extremely anti-worker and anti-union) provides a rare opportunity to deregulate working conditions even further, in order to maximise its profits. It announced to the delivery workers that they must accept becoming free-lancers, as “partners” of the company. That meant losing whatever minimal protection was left to them as workers, and engaging in a vicious competition among each other in order to obtain lousy piecework pay.
A sensational strike followed, which won a major victory, based on two factors: One, the best traditions of the workers united front. The strike was supported by the close co-ordination of the Union of Workers in Food and Tourism (an established sectoral union with a long history, where the Communist Party is the dominant force) with the “Rank-And-File Assembly of Two-Wheeler Rider Workers” (SVEOD by its Greek initials), which is one of the new syndicalist-style unions, which has strong roots among delivery workers and a serious involvement of anarchist/autonomist forces.
Second, the manifestation of a powerful wave of solidarity with the delivery workers, who, especially during the lockdowns, people recognised as essential. Public use of E-Food services collapsed during the strike, and the government realised that it couldn’t afford to attack the workers who organised massive motorbike-protests. E-Food was forced into a disorderly retreat, announcing that the 2,016 delivery workers employed by the company would from then on be hired on open-ended (permanent) contracts, which is the most regulated labour arrangement that remains in Greece. This victory was wildly celebrated and encouraged the rest of the working class.
Of course, the battle at E-Food was not an isolated incident. In public hospitals (against cuts in social spending) and in public schools (against a new program of “evaluation” for teachers), a full calendar of strike-actions is under way. Next to this traditional core of organised workers, activity among new parts of the working class will hopefully emerge, which is why the victorious example of E-Food is especially important and has potential consequences in the longer term.
The mood among the working-class is not counted exclusively by the level of strike activity. This summer, the experiences of the pandemic combined with the experiences of the disastrous wildfires to generate a climate of popular indignation and anger against the government of prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The political toll on the government and Mitsotakis himself was reflected in opinion polls, in which confidence in the ruling party was reduced.
It was this issue that Mitsotakis tried to address with his speech at the Thessaloniki International Fair, a traditional focal point for political debate. Prior to the fair, the press heralded the announcement of a distributive program. This program was proven limited and mostly oriented towards capitalists (via a tax cut) and the rich (via the cancellation of assets and large properties transfer taxes). The political message of Mitsotakis was clear: “We are not shifting in our policy!”. While, even on the face of major threats (pandemic) and major disasters (wildfires), “the government’s priority remains promoting its program and completing its project of reforms”.
In the next two weeks two moves highlighted the reality of the government’s program. The first was the privatisation of the Port of Piraeus, with the Chinese giant Cosco obtaining 51 percent of the shares. The dockworkers in Piraeus, who had already had the bitter experience of what it means to work for Cosco (refusal of any collective contract, a ban on unionism, extreme intensification of workload), were now completely unprotected inside a “Free Zone” (like the notorious Special Economic Zones) which was established in the biggest port of the country. Meanwhile, Cosco is free to promote its project of expansion, including connecting the port with railways, and building a logistics centre, hotels and conference halls.
The second was the sudden announcement that the government was privatising the Public Power Corporation (public electricity company), selling 51 percent of its shares. Maintaining the majority share of the Public Power Corporation was until recently a “red line” even among bourgeois political forces, which considered the production of electric power as a sector of strategic importance for Greek capitalism and its state.
Already, the company had been fragmented and the management of the distribution network privatised by selling it to Macquarie Group, a notorious Australian conglomerate which has been described as a vampire, as it tends to buy public utility companies, suck them dry and then abandon them, leaving ruins behind.
But this time around, Mitsotakis is privatising the actual production of electric power, meaning factories, hydropower projects and mines, affecting thousands of workers. As the neoliberals triumphantly declared in the press, this is the biggest privatisation in the history of the country.
These moves leave no space for illusions about the direction of the economic and social policy of the government. Despite some questioning in the mainstream discourse in the US and parts of Europe, the Greek government remains fully committed to a neoliberal agenda and strategy. But in order to fully understand the nature of this government, we must also take into account its moves in two other fields.
Militarism
In Thessaloniki, Mitsotakis announced plans to expand the initial purchase of 18 expensive French Rafale warplanes to 24. This extravagance was announced in a country which, just a few weeks before, had been in desperate need of firefighting aircraft but lacked them…
Mitsotakis also announced a colossal program of naval expansion, including the purchase of three French Belharra frigates and three French Gowind corvettes. These warships are considered “heavy gear” (especially the Belharra frigates which are characterised as “Blue Water Navy”, meaning a maritime force than can operate across the deep waters of open oceans). They have a long rage, a big destructive firepower, and they can provide electronic support to the destructive force of other weaponry. The warmongering websites that “specialise” in militarism, argue that the Greek navy is upgraded from a defensive force in the Aegean Sea to a force “strategically present” in the wider Eastern Mediterranean.
The overall amount of public investment to new warplanes and warships is now more than 10 billion euros, a colossal number for the size of the Greek economy. It is a provocation for a country whose public schools and hospitals are facing collapse.
There is also a backstory to the decision to buy the Belharra frigates. The government had leaked to the press that it intended to purchase the smaller and cheaper American MSCC frigates. But, as described by a journalist who specialises in questions of “national interest”, the admirals revolted, demanding the more modern, more aggressive French warships. And the government happily complied.
Because Mitsotakis, in addition to the Rafale warplanes and the Belharra frigates, has also purchased from Macron the Mutual Defence Agreement between Greece and France. This agreement declares that any act of war against either of the two countries will automatically activate the military engagement of the other. With this agreement, French imperialism is making its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean official. There, it will find an already established network of alliances among Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel, where French imperialism will play an upgraded, if not leading, role.
Those who—especially after AUKUS—consider European/US relations as solely (or mostly) competitive, should examine the example of Greece’s positioning in Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.
While the French-Greek agreement was announced, negotiations on the Mutual Defensive Agreement between Greece and the US were finalised. This agreement stipulates an upgrade of US military bases in Suda (on the island of Crete), Alexandroupoli (next to the Greco-Turkish border), Larisa and Stefanoviki in Magnisia (central Greece). In exchange, the Greek state will receive US weaponry, including the upgrading of the F-16 warplanes to Viper, incorporation of Greece to the production of F-35 and purchase of missiles and precision projectiles for the ground forces.
The constant argument of the neoliberals against any workers’ demands, the claim that “there are no funds available” to satisfy them, is proven to be an utter lie when it comes to armaments and the Greco-Turkish competition for regional dominance.
Institutional Racism
In contemporary Greece, as well as the rest of Europe, refugees suffer extreme atrocities that can only be described as state crimes.
Dozens of refuges who succeed in reaching Greek shores, after much effort and torment, are found by the coast guards and then they… disappear. When antiracist organisations ask about their whereabouts, official state authorities reply shamelessly: “Don’t know. No comment”. It is common knowledge that these people are “repatriated”, meaning they are dumped on Turkish shores in the most illegal, inhumane and dangerous way. It is a monstrous escalation of the push-back tactic used by the coast guard, which involves forcefully stopping refugee boats from entering Greek territorial waters.
Mitsotakis didn’t hesitate to give to this policy an ideological dimension and take full responsibility for it. In his Thessaloniki speech, he emphasised that his government’s goal is to secure “zero arrivals” and that this a job that can be done “by the police and the coast guard”. This policy is two-fold: One the one hand, the police make sure that life for any refugees who reach the country is unbearable, in order to send the message—as Mitsotakis said—“Don’t come here!”. On the other hand, the coast guard uses illegal “pirate” tactics to make sure that only a few will manage to get across the border.
Those who believe that neoliberals are still some sort of liberals when it comes to civil rights, should think twice. The government of Mitsotakis is a clear example of neoliberal pro-capitalist policies going hand-in-hand with ruthless nationalism and militarism, and institutional, state-sanctioned racism.
Thus, it is no coincidence that despite the great antifascist victory that led to the outlawing of far-right parliamentary party Golden Dawn and its leaders being sent to prison, the governmental continues to create conditions that favour the reactivation of fascist groups. Some recent dangerous attacks by fascists against leftists in schools of the poorer districts in Thessaloniki highlight this threat.
To sum things up, we are facing the most dangerous government we have faced in Greece since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974. Nevertheless, it has suffered some blows and its political capital has declined as a result of the bitter experience that is living under its rule.
Mitsotakis’ government is heading towards some serious tests. In 2023, Greek capitalism will have to address yet again its debt crisis and find a new working balance as part of the renegotiation of the EU Stability Pact.
But this doesn’t mean that the government is about to collapse (at least not yet). It still enjoys the support of the ruling class. And Mitsotakis will seek to utilise this support to aggressively impose his rule.
So the politics and tactics of the parties in opposition are an important factor. In Thessaloniki, former-prime minister Alexis Tsipras made a speech to address what Mitsotakis had said a week earlier. He spoke for hours and succeeded in not mentioning the word “Left” even once! He talked about a “new beginning”, with the “middle class” playing a central role, through the formation of a “broad-progressive government”. Even the past symbols and colours of SYRIZA (a left wing electoral coalition) were absent from the room where he gave the speech and press conference. The colour green prevailed (which in Greece is identified with social-democratic PASOK), while Tsipras reproduced the most typical slogans of Andreas Papandreou, the historical founder and leader of PASOK.
The vacuum in left-wing politics is obvious. This puts some pressure on the Communist Party, which is called upon by the situation to display some initiative. It is unclear whether it will do so, or most importantly what kind of initiatives it might take. The situation is also putting pressure to the forces of the radical left to address the situation of its fragmentation in the aftermath of the defeat of 2015.
The hopeful element in this picture is the tendency towards a revitalisation of struggles from below. For us, the workers’ victory in E-Food and the message it sent to the rest of the working class are especially important.

Greece: Savage neoliberalism, militarism, institutional racism and a victorious social struggle

The account of this disastrous August, when temperatures and drought reached record high levels even for a warm and dry country like Greece, is literally tragic. Huge and uncontrollable wildfires in Evia, Attica, Peloponisos and other regions turned 375,000 acres of forested land into ashes. 
This overwhelming loss is even more important for a country like Greece, where the ratio of free green spaces to the population has shrunk to lower levels than any other country in Europe.
The visible consequences are already serious. Thousands of people lost their homes, while even more lost their jobs (livestock breeders, farmers, beekeepers, small/family tourist businesses etc). But the non-visible consequences are even more menacing: it is known that the summer heatwaves are succeeded by autumn rains, and when this happens the mountains, stripped of forests, will threaten villages and small towns with floods and landslides.
In the Mediterranean landscape, the loss of forests is usually accompanied with loss of fertile land, since the erosion from wind and rain transforms it into rock. The big cities, and especially Athens, will also face serious problems. During this year’s wildfires, the last “green lungs” of Attica were burnt and the rough living conditions in this anarchic capital of 5 million inhabitants will become even rougher, especially for the poor who are crowded in the dense neighbourhoods of the inner city and the western suburbs. It is no coincidence that for some time now the rich have been abandoning their traditional residences in the city centre and moving to newly built suburbs in the north and along the southern coast.
It is worth mentioning that the disaster is far from over. The last weeks of the summer (which in Greece extends well into September) are traditionally a time of strong winds and high temperatures. As a result, the threat of wildfires remains high in many parts of the country.
Facing this disaster, the government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis reacted with panic. It abandoned all efforts to contain the fires (in Evia they stopped only when they reached the sea), and sent successive directives to the population of threatened villages and even small towns to evacuate immediately. This “white flag” of surrender by the organised state machine became so blatant that a big part of the population didn’t comply with the orders of evacuation, despite the obvious threat. Poor people, and especially the youth, without any training or the necessary means, stayed in their places and fought to save their villages, their fellow humans, the animals and their fields. Whatever was saved—including some important parts of forest lands—was saved thanks to their self-sacrifice, the tough work of the very few firefighters and the groups of volunteers who rushed there to help.
The day after, Mitsotakis tried to whitewash his government by emphasizing the menacing climate crisis. This public acknowledgment of the menace, while very belated, is correct. This year’s prolonged heatwave and drought was an unprecedented experience even in terms of the warm and dry Greek summer. But when this is stated by Mitsotakis and the government officials, it is pure hypocrisy. The climate crisis is not a new phenomenon. Many reports by the Forest Service and the Fire Department have been warning the government that the anticipated weather conditions would turn the pinewoods of central and southern Greece into flammable material.
In reality, when right-wing politicians start referring to the climate crisis, it is something more than the traditional (and anticipated) governmental hypocrisy. They are laying the ideological ground so that the projects to “rebuild” after the catastrophe will be in accordance with the neoliberal direction of New Democracy. The “green policy” of Mitsotakis amounts to ceding the management of forests, the management of public space, even the management of natural disasters, to the hands of the private sector and entrepreneurship.
Twenty or thirty years ago, they argued that the only viable response to austerity and unemployment is “liberating the market”. In a similar vein, today they argue that the only viable response to the climate crisis is “liberating” capital’s endeavours for business activities in the forests, the mountains, the water, and the air. Already in Evia, the vultures of the market are called upon by the government to take up a leading role in rebuilding. Among these vultures, there are the big construction companies that before the fires had declared their interest in constructing enormous “wind turbine parks” in the dense forests on Northern Evia. The rejection of their previous offers by the Forest Service and the local municipalities (even the ones controlled by the governing party) is now breeding suspicions among the residents of Northern Evia about the possibility of an organised arson.
There is no need for conspiracy theories in order to understand that the established policies played an arsonist role. The disastrous wildfires this summer took on great proportions because the climate crisis was intersected with years of harsh austerity and cutting funds in the public sector, especially the part of the public sector that relates to the living conditions of the poor. The Fire Department was left with 250 (!) firefighters in its motorised units and 1,200 firefighters in its “infantry” units, to cover the needs of the whole country! Until last year, they were supplemented with “seasonal” not fully trained firefighters, who were hired just for the summer and then fired. This year, the government refused to rehire 5,000 of these firefighters, despite the warnings about the extreme dangers ahead.
In terms of firefighting aircraft—absolutely necessary in the peculiar geographical terrain of Greece—there are only fifteen antiquated Canadair planes (out of which it was proven that only eight were in a position to fly), and there are only 250 firefighters to operate them, both on the surface and in the air.
The cuts in firefighting personnel and equipment have led to a huge increase in the area burnt by each (single) “mega-fire” during the years after the major economic crisis: from 1,500 acres of land per “mega-fire” in 2008, we reached 5,000 acres per fire in 2020. Wildfires have become more disastrous because of the reduction in the means and the personnel available for the society to deal with them. 
This shocking truth becomes even worse if we also take into account the dangers posed by cutbacks in other relevant sectors, for example in the field of environmentally managing the forests and the peripheral areas, or in the field of maintaining the transmission electricity grid, which in many cases is responsible for the start of fires.
The end result was that during this year’s extreme test, the disaster in Greece was, by comparison, much bigger than any other country in the region. The area consumed by fire can be compared only with that in neighbouring Turkey (370,250 acres), a country which is six times the size of Greece.
The ruling class knows that in the coming period it will have to combine dealing with the climate crisis and dealing with the economic crisis. The working-class movement and the left should do the same.
Unfortunately, on this crucial issue, the news is not good. SYRIZA chose (with such timing!) to display “responsibility” as a “creative” opposition. Alexis Tsipras, beyond certain cost-free rhetorical flourishes, asked Mitsotakis to promote initiatives towards “national consensus” in the face of the rebuilding effort. He actually lagged behind Fofi Gennimata, the current leader of PASOK, which at least asked for the resignations of certain ministers.
It was another affirmation of SYRIZA’s representative in the European Parliament, Stelios Kouloglou, who once wrote that the political direction of Tsipras is “the mildest opposition ever since the fall of the military junta”.
This direction is out of touch with the popular mood. The screams of the fire victims that “we were left alone!” reached every household. On social media, a hashtag that roughly translates as “Mitsotakis Go Fuck Yourself” went viral. In Evia, on 25 August, the first massive protest against the government was organised by the union of forestry workers and the committees of fire victims. It is very common to read or hear references to the slogan “only the people can save people”. The radical and anti-capitalist left organised the first protest against the government in Athens, with a decent turnout despite the difficulties of the summer.
An experienced reader of the press can distinguish that for the first time since the electoral victory of New Democracy in 2019, the confidence and the arrogance of right-wing politicians is in the past. Mitsotakis is already facing a situation of popular anger. This is the perfect “fuel” for the political developments. The “political time” thickens.
After the disastrous wildfires, the government doesn’t have the time to regroup. The COVID pandemic is raging again, with scientists warning that the fourth wave will be even harder, and schools are planned to open on 13 September. It is possible to overthrow this government, under the condition that there is a sizeable pole of attraction that can take up the initiative to bring it down.
Originally published by <a href="https://internationalsocialism.net/greece-after-the-wildfires/">International Socialism Project</a>.

Greece after the wildfires

The Greek government of prime minister Alexis Tsipras is continuing to drive through austerity policies demanded by creditors as a condition for further aid for the Greek economy. To win support for the third memorandum in parliament, Tsipras relied not only the votes of SYRIZA’s coalition partners, the right wing Independent Greeks (ANEL) led by Panos Kammenos, but pro-austerity parties such as New Democracy and PASOK.
Antonis Davanellos is a leading member of the Greek socialist group Internationalist Workers’ Left (DEA, by its initials in Greek), one of the organisations that co-founded SYRIZA in 2004. He was a member of SYRIZA’s central committee and its smaller political secretariat until the resignation of the party’s Left Platform following Tsipras’ betrayal. He currently serves on the national leadership body of the recently formed left wing alliance Popular Unity (PU).
Here, Davanellos lays out the organisational challenges faced by Popular Unity in the coming months and suggests a perspective for moving forward. First published at <a href="http://www.rproject.gr/">the Red Network website</a> in Greece, the article appeared, along with the introduction that prefaces it, in French at <a href="http://alencontre.org/europe/grece-avec-lunite-populaire-face-a-de-nouveaux-affrontements-ils-ne-font-que-commencer.html">A l’encontre</a>, and was translated into English by Todd Chretien for <a href="http://www.socialistworker.org/">SocialistWorker.org</a>.
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Introduction | By the editorial board of A l’encontre
In April 2015, the European Commission predicted 0.5 percent growth in Greek gross domestic product for 2015 and 2.9 percent for 2016. It is not clear how it came to this conclusion. Perhaps its experts were enjoying low-cost vacations in the Greek islands?
Reality has been much tougher this October, at least with respect to these predictions. In 2015, GDP will fall by around 1.4 percent and another 1.3 percent in 2016. Officially, an increase in 2.7 percent is being forecast for 2017! In other words, the full-blown recession will continue, so the predictions for 2017 will once again be refuted, even if, after finally hitting bottom, the economy rebounds a bit.
The drastic cuts called for by the third Memorandum (and the first and second in 2010 and 2012) have squeezed Greek capitalism. Tsipras, since the elections in September, has been promising economic relief – including for employment – by the end of 2016. But now that the electoral fog is dissipating, it turns out that the difficulties are only beginning.
Before his trip to Greece on 3 and 4 November, European commissioner Pierre Moscovici declared, “Challenges remain, and difficult decisions will have to be taken before the end of the year”. This goes to show that the 2 billion euro tranche “loan” will not be delivered unless the Tsipras-Kammenos government rigorously applies the austerity policies it has co-signed with the troika. Another deadline has been slated by Eurogroup finance ministers for 16 November, to decide whether or not to allocate 2 two billion euros.
With respect to the budget deficit, it is estimated to surpass 3.6 percent of GDP in 2016 and 2.2 percent in 2017, despite the theoretical recovery envisaged. Meanwhile, the debt burden remains heavy. Official figures peg it at 194.8 percent of GDP for 2015 and 199.7 percent for 2016. The debt-to-GDP ratio will only increase under the impact of the policies inflicted on the Greek economy, while restructuring the debt (extending deadlines, modifying interest rates, annulling a small part) lingers on as wishful thinking. All this while Popular Unity and ANTARSYA continue to demand the annulment of the bulk of debt.
According to the Greek media, the Public Power Company (DEH in Greek) announced potential electricity cut-offs for 2.1 million households. The total amount of unpaid bills has been estimated at 2.5 billion euros. Aside from some businesses that can’t pay their bills – which add up to around 1.8 billion euros – there are tens of thousands of households who cannot afford this basic necessity. For example, a household that pays 52 euros twice a month for its electricity, according to the rules set out by DEH, currently receives a bill of 100 euros twice a month because of the multiple taxes (IVA, among others) and interest charges for overdue past amounts.
DEH now plans on sending out payment notices. So just before the winter months, it will announce – of course, “with a certain social sensitivity” – that it is cutting off the lights if total arrears are not paid all at once. For many people, this will mark the memorandum’s nightfall.
When it comes to health care, hundreds of thousands of people lack insurance. The Coalition of Doctors in Solidarity with the Community in the Attica region recently stated:
“Our public health system requires urgent funding. Yet on the contrary, it is being placed under the control of a private structure for auditing and management. On the contrary, the third memorandum [of Tsipras] imposes cuts to the budget of more than 3 billion euros for three years …; the few remaining subsidies still available to disabled people will be cut and may even be eliminated.”
On 12 November, Popular Unity, the Communist Party (KKE by its initials in Greek) and the unions called for a day of protests and strikes, and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/nov/12/greek-general-strike-against-austerity-measures-business-live">at least 20,000 took to the streets of Athens</a>. Fifty days after Tsipras’ September electoral victory, three themes are driving these first mobilisations. First, the brutal cuts set out in the budget framework; second, the fall in employment triggered by privatisations and budget cuts; and third, the threat of evictions from primary residences if mortgage payments aren’t paid to the banks.
The troika reduced the annual income limit that protects the poorest families who cannot pay their mortgage from foreclosure. For the rest, the price ceiling for mortgage support will be the price of the residence as determined in 2007, and not the market price for 2015, which will reduce protection by a considerable amount for these indebted families, with respect to the 250,000-euro limit set before the new memorandum. In this way, unemployed and retired workers will be in greater danger of losing their homes because the recapitalisation of the banks is a major priority for the Greek ruling class and its “partners in the eurozone”.
This is the background to the 12 November strike. It is one of the first tests of strength for the Tsipras government, the social movements and the forces of the radical left who, among others, emerged from the break with SYRIZA, especially Popular Unity.
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The Goals of Popular Unity | Antonis Davanellos
The debate about the radical left’s orientation in Greece is at a turning point. The terms of this debate are defined by the start of the third memorandum’s assault on the Greek people, under the political direction of the SYRIZA-ANEL government.
This raises the question of the possibility/plausibility of mass worker and people’s resistance, as well as the question of how this resistance will express itself politically in the post-SYRIZA era – “post” in the sense of coming after the government led by Tsipras between when he was elected in January 2015 through its evolution until the signing of the third memorandum on 13 July.
Popular Unity (PU) is the central site of this discussion because, despite its electoral defeat on 20 September 20 – when PU won 2.86 percent of the vote, below the 3 percent threshold necessary to win seats in parliament – it is recognised by a very important number of militants at the national level.
It is seen as a means, although very rudimentary, to bring together within local and sectoral organisations the efforts of militants who share a common reference to Marxism (even if coming from diverse angles) and a socialist perspective. Within its ranks, there is a gathering of militants who have accumulated important experiences within organisations based on struggle and mass action.
At the same time, PU can and must play a key role in attracting men and women who have left SYRIZA (and who continue to leave) and in building a relationship with all the militants who belong to ANTARSYA (the Front of the Greek Anti-capitalist Left), as well as in creating possible links to rank and file factions in the Greek Communist Party.
All of this points to the great importance attached to the discussion inside the PU in the run up to its first national pre-conference at the end of 2015 and its first national conference at the beginning of 2016.
1. The results of the 20 September elections were an important victory for the forces behind the memorandum and most of all for the Tsipras (SYRIZA) and Kammenos (ANEL) leadership. Of course, this victory was coerced: It was obtained before the masses were able to come to grips with the concrete reality of the third memorandum and it was based on the misleading promise that certain “corrections” would be made to the austerity policies, along with a parallel humanitarian program.
The election took place under the supposed threat of a return to government by the traditional, pro-memorandum forces of the right (New Democracy, to Potami, Pasok) as well as with the support of the entire political-governmental system, the national bourgeoisie (with its influence over the media) and even the international creditors (Hollande, Merkel, Lagarde, etc.). In this sense, the victory of Tsipras and Kammenos on 20 September is unstable and shallow.
2. The signs of instability are present in the election results themselves – for instance, in the decline of SYRIZA’s absolute vote total, the unprecedented rate of abstention and the apolitical vote for media personality Vassilis Leventis, who won 3.43 percent. But most of all, the instability and uncertainty derive from the government’s obligations pertaining to the 13 July agreement.
The government of Tsipras and Kammenos must immediately begin the work of imposing the rigorous class program of the third memorandum. All the campaign promises about “corrective” measures and a “parallel” program are now finished. And we are, once again, on the chopping block.
The demolition of the social security system, the fiscal racket played out on the backs of the popular classes, the rapid and massive privatisations, the rigid insistence on reducing salaries and social spending – all of these constitute a program aimed at supporting the capitalists and the creditors while degrading working-class and popular living conditions.
At the same time, the recapitalisation of the banks entails dealing with bad debts made to certain businesses. Settling these debts implies a change in the relations between various fractions of the ruling class. Such operations never go smoothly. The Tsipras government is going to have to confront intensified rivalries in the heart of the bourgeoisie, likely provoking very severe political tensions.
3. The history of the Greek class struggle reminds us that social resistance to these sorts of policies has already brought down various government – be it George Papandreou’s government in November 2011 or that of Loukas Papdemos in May 2012, or that of Samaras and Venizelos in January 2015. There is no reason to expect that, in the medium term, this resistance will be any more “tolerant” in the face of the current Tsipras-Kammenos government.
Overall, the fact that this time, the memorandum’s attack will be carried out by a party that speaks in the name of the left and uses anti-austerity language and symbols means we will face particular tasks. We cannot and we must not wait passively for the movement to spontaneously come to maturity. The radical left must take initiatives to help overcome the electoral shock suffered in September and aid in the recovery of the movement’s confidence by mobilising workers and youth.
Decisions by PU to organise specific campaigns (regarding social security, privatisations, the rights of the youth) are a critical part of a political overhaul.
4. A key component of this overhaul is bound up in the elaboration of a political program. In our opinion, the experience of the SYRIZA era provides evidence for four pillars that should be kept in mind in developing a distinct political program for PU.
a) We should maintain our commitment to overturning the memorandums by opposing and tearing down austerity.
b) To effectively put this policy in motion, we must continue fighting to stop payments to the creditors, annul the debt (or at least the vast majority of it), nationalise the banks and abolish capital’s basic “freedoms”.
c) Based on the experience of Cyprus, but even more so based on the Tsipras government’s experience of “negotiations” with the “institutions”, which went on for seven months, we must be clear that it is necessary to insist on the possibility of exiting the eurozone as well as entering into conflict with and disobeying the eurozone and the European Union.
d) All of the points referred to above must be integrated into a clear perspective aimed at social emancipation. This is the key element that politically clarifies all our demands, both intermediate and transitional, and that frees the radical left from confused anti-memorandum or semi-bourgeois politics.
It is true that, during the electoral campaign, PU suffered from an insufficient elaboration regarding its proposal for leaving the eurozone. This discussion should continue until it is possible to come to a conclusion, one which not only includes a “technical” presentation, but above all explains how our “anti-euro” policy fits into an overall program for the radical left. This program must speak in the name of the labouring masses and provide an alternative in the face of neoliberal capitalism’s aggression.
5. Popular Unity’s response to the question of alliances is equally important. The proposal for unity in action of the political left (between PU, ANTARSYA and a part of the KKE’s rank and file, without abandoning a critique of the party leadership’s orientation and practice) is another necessary condition for linking together and giving political expression to the “world of resistance”.
6. It might be that the most important of the four pillars is how PU understands its own role, how it organises itself and how it projects these decisions. Today, a political front is what we need – a front composed of organisations and individuals with a clearly defined internal functioning, a front which puts its emphasis on “organising the base” and devolves responsibilities and rights to the regional bodies in which the party’s members participate directly. Its structures should be based on the principle of “one member, one vote”, and decisions should seek to develop consensus or, when necessary, be taken according to the principle of majority rule.
We need a front, but we are also aware that PU is “under construction”. This means that we must insist on the necessity of its expansion, with an orientation to political groups leaving SYRIZA as well as political groups from the other left beyond SYRIZA’s circles. This means that we must put the accent on recognising the fact that political and programmatic decisions, as well as the leadership organs, are temporary and cannot be solidified until the first national conference.
We hope that this conference will attract the participation of many activists beyond only those who joined PU at its birth during the hot month of August. This is an ambition best served by adopting an open approach, one that is fully democratic and based on building a new common space for the Greek radical left to fight the memorandum – a goal which is absolutely necessary and possible.
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This article and its introduction were published in French at the <a href="http://alencontre.org/europe/grece-avec-lunite-populaire-face-a-de-nouveaux-affrontements-ils-ne-font-que-commencer.html">A l’encontre website</a> and translated into English by Todd Chretien for <a href="http://www.socialistworker.org/">www.SocialistWorker.org</a>.­

The goals of Popular Unity

The Greek government led by the left wing party SYRIZA has been pushed closer to the brink. Soon it will have to choose between paying its debt to international lenders and paying wages and pensions – one of the so-called “red lines” that prime minister Alexis Tsipras promised would not be crossed.
The left wing of the party is organising pressure on Tsipras and other government leaders to remain committed to SYRIZA’s pledges, even if that means an open breach with the EU.
Antonis Davanellos is a member of the Internationalist Workers Left (DEA), which co-founded SYRIZA, and currently a member of SYRIZA’s central committee and political secretariat and one of the party’s best-known left voices. In this article for DEA’s newspaper Workers’ Left, he analyses the decisive confrontation to come in Greece.
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Many of us didn’t accept the rhetoric about SYRIZA’s program put forward during the election campaign to gain votes, but which failed to answer a crucial question: would it be possible to carry out a radical anti-austerity program while accepting the limits of the eurozone and through negotiations with its “institutions”?
Today, we know the answer: no.
The EU and the IMF are trying to crush SYRIZA by forcing it to face a dilemma: accept all the terms and conditions of integration into the euro system or face the immediate overthrow of the government. Their motive is both economic, because SYRIZA’s anti-austerity program is incompatible with the prevailing policy, and also political, because they want to protect Europe against the spread of the SYRIZA-Podemos threat to austerity policies.
The 20 February agreement accepted by the Tsipras government was a major error that resulted from being trapped by SYRIZA’s election rhetoric. We made the commitment to repay the debt “in full and on time”, and we renounced any “unilateral action” to implement our party’s program, which would have built a more solid alliance of workers and popular masses in support of the government. We got nothing. The “creative ambiguity” that Yanis Varoufakis talked about worked – it worked in the interest of the powerful.
After 20 February, we tried to defend the “red lines” that the government promised would not be crossed – even though these were far less than the commitments that Tsipras made at the Thessaloniki International Fair in September 2014, which in turn were inferior to the program approved by SYRIZA at its founding conference.
Today, the “red lines” have disappeared. On the subject of privatisations – the emblematic policy of neoliberalism – we talk about the price and the terms of the sale, and which companies will be sold, not whether they will be sold. On the subject of taxes, the unfair ENFIA real estate tax and raising the value-added tax are considered areas where concessions might be made to the lenders, and not measures that must be overturned as a matter of improving the life of working people, as we insisted before the elections.
On social security and pensions, we guarantee the income of seniors today, while leaving open the possibility of cuts in benefits for future generations. On labour issues, we have moved from the commitment to restore collective agreements toward the nebulous formula of implementing the “best practices of Europe”, as defined by the International Labour Organization – with the risk that this means incorporating into those collective agreements neoliberal criteria such as the financial stability of firms and enterprises and their economic competitiveness.
It is obvious to anyone who wishes to look that we have been caught in a downward spiral – a negotiation where at each step, we have to defend the demands of working people at ever lower levels.
It is also obvious where this downhill spiral leads – to compel the government to sign a third memorandum, the agreement that the lenders were preparing to sign with Samaras and Venizelos [the leaders of the two main pro-austerity parties, New Democracy and PASOK, whose coalition government was defeated by SYRIZA on 25 January].
It is also clear when the precise timing of this extortion will take place – when the government is forced to seek loans to pay for salaries and pensions and not merely debt repayments. At this moment, the lenders calculate that the government will not have the political power to express the slightest objection.
The decision to continue every repayment of debt and interest as required by the February agreement – even though the lenders have not given a single penny of the funds they promised, and that are, in fact, due to Greece – has almost exhausted the reserves of public funds, bringing the critical moment very, very near.
The political consequences of this retreat – because it is no longer possible to speak about a “compromise” – will be dire. SYRIZA cannot be transformed into an austerity party. The lenders will not be satisfied to keep the government bound to the agreement they made in February. They will make the Tsipras government pay for its victory on 25 January, demanding that it be “broadened” and transformed gradually into a national unity government, or else overthrown.
The media speculation about Yannis Stournaras, the governor of the Bank of Greece, serving as prime minister of a pro-Europe, technocratic government, like the one led by Lucas Papademos from November 2011 to May 2012, should be seen as a warning.
There is a way out of this vicious circle, though it becomes more difficult to achieve with each passing week as repayments are made to the lenders: stop repaying the debt, which will also require placing controls on capital leaving the country; implement the decisions of the SYRIZA conference for social control of the banks, plus taxing capital and the wealthy to fund anti-austerity measures; and defending this policy by any means necessary, including an open conflict with the EU and the euro.
Such a break, which would have been accepted after the 25 January election, today might require a reaffirmation of the government’s popular mandate – including new elections, provided that the options going forward are presented clearly by the government and have the support of the whole of SYRIZA.
In any case, the crucial decisions cannot be made by a small and closed circle at the top, even with the best intentions. SYRIZA – from its central committee to its local branches – must be asked to decide. The party must stand against the headwinds that become increasingly menacing.

The moment of truth for SYRIZA

Antonis Davanellos is one of the best-known figures on the left wing of the Greek governing party, the radical left Syriza. He is a member of the Internationalist Workers Left (DEA) and is currently a member of Syriza’s Central Committee and Political Secretariat. In this article for DEA’s newspaper Workers’ Left, he emphasises the importance of the party’s rank and file, and its grassroots organisations, for the struggles that lie ahead. This article was first published at <a href="http://Socialistworker.org">Socialistworker.org</a>.
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Since the elections of 25 January, we have seen daily that Syriza may have won government office, but it is not in power.
The relentless opposition from the pockets of real state power – including the characteristic challenges of top officials within the economic and judicial bureaucracy, but also the alarming actions of the Naval Special Forces teams [who chanted far right nationalist slogans during the annual Independence Day march on 25 March], should remind everyone, but especially the leadership of Syriza, of the importance of the decree of the party’s founding congress – that a “government of the left” isn’t the final destination, with the task of “saving the country”, but a transition point on a road that must lead toward socialist liberation.
The Syriza-led government’s positions are weaker still if viewed in terms of the international balance of power. The brazen blackmail of the European “institutions” and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is designed to force the government to choose between direct subordination to the lenders or rapid collapse.
To paraphrase a famous saying from the time of the Russian revolution: Without a transformed policy in Europe, without the outbreak of a political resistance movement led by the left in Spain or Ireland or France or Italy, we will perish.
This reality places a clear obligation on the members and leaders of Syriza, among others. Our policy must be to maintain an active call for a Europe-wide uprising to overthrow austerity.
The awareness of the difficulties we face and the need to translate these aims and obligations into concrete action are not unfolding in conditions of our own choosing. The decline of the mass struggles of 2010-12, which created the mass support for Syriza and eventually propelled it into office, has created a lull – a temporary waiting period while the effectiveness of the electoral road to overthrowing austerity is tested.
But this lull restricts our political potential and – along with the failure of any concrete international support to materialise – creates opportunities for our local and international rivals. All of our strength and abilities within these obviously difficult conditions must be directed toward finding initiatives that can create the possibility of international support in aid of Greece.
This assessment leads directly to the crucial role of Syriza as a party.
In the mainstream media, the party is depicted in a negative light: as a dead weight that prevents its leadership from taking bold action (action to the liking of the lenders and markets, of course); as a nest of fossilised Marxists who won’t allow the enlightened leaders of the government and the state to make the necessary overtures – for example, to the To Potami party – and guide the government safely to the calm waters of the centre left, with an acceptance of the European lenders’ oversight of government policy and a commitment to remain in the euro, no matter what.
Indeed, the party of Syriza does have this important “defensive” role to play. Under vast internal and international pressures, it is an irreplaceable factor for enabling the government to remain connected to the original policies and program Syriza was founded on. Precisely because it can demand accountability [from its leaders], the organisation of the party at its base, among its rank and file members, must be maintained and decisively strengthened.
But a defensive role is not enough. The party organisations of Syriza must take aggressive initiatives, attempting to mobilise a mass challenge against our common political opponents. These initiatives can press for radical change and social gains based initially on Syriza’s campaign commitments made last year at the Thessaloniki International Trade Fair, but also more comprehensively in the Syriza program from its founding conference.
For example, the government’s capacity to resist internal and international pressure for privatisation will depend directly on mobilising mass opposition to act against the HRDAF [the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, the state-run agency in charge of privatisation], in the defence of public spaces and resources, to stop the crime in Skouries [a village near Salonika, where a local movement is opposing the sale of a gold mine] and so on.
The ability of the government to resist further destruction of the public health system will depend directly on whether and how Syriza members and base organisations take the lead in the protests and public discussions of resistance, speaking to the demands and expectations of health workers in particular and the working class majority in need of a public hospital system.
These initiatives should be planned carefully, but they must also come decisively and quickly, because time is not on our side.
This insistence on a radical left program, on standing for the people, and on popular mobilisations is the only way forward for Syriza as a party. In fact, it is the only way forward for the government, caught as it is between the Scylla and Charybdis [an expression derived from Greek mythology, which means “having to choose between two evils”] of local and international capital.
The mainstream media regularly display their contempt for the Marxist radical wing inside Syriza and demand that the party’s leaders eliminate it as a condition for being recognised as “reliable” and “realistic”. This wing within Syriza is real and with more influence than many media analysts acknowledge. It has demonstrated many times that it is a valuable and irreplaceable factor in the political dynamic of Syriza – far more so than is the norm for mass political parties.
The many people who are not connected to any tendency within Syriza, but who look to the party’s mobilisation based on a radical left program – this is the power that leads the way forward. The road ahead must start with fighting for and achieving what we promised before the election. But it must also continue toward the broader objective of overthrowing austerity, once and for all.

A dangerous government in Greece

Greece: Savage neoliberalism, militarism, institutional racism and a victorious social struggle

Greece after the wildfires

The goals of Popular Unity

The moment of truth for SYRIZA

Greece: the government, the party and the people

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