“We’re not asking for much, just the fall of the regime.”
This is one of the slogans being raised in the wave of mass protests currently rocking Syria, in a stunning rebuke to the narrative that the 2011 revolution has been extinguished. As Syrian activist Leila al-Shami puts it: 
“These courageous women and men across the country have shown that the regime cannot bomb, starve, torture, gas and rape the Syrian people into submission. Despite everything they have been through, and in the absence of meaningful solidarity with their struggle, the dream of a free Syria is alive.”
From mid-August, from its centre in the southern Suweida province, dominated by the Druze religious minority, the demonstrations spread to neighbouring Daraa, where the 2011 revolution began, to Damascus towns and suburbs, to 55 locations in the south and then to regime-held Aleppo in the north. The upsurge has even spread to the traditionally pro-Assad province of Latakia, heartland of the Alawite religious minority, leading to solidarity demonstrations in opposition-held Aleppo, Idlib, Azaz, al-Bab, Raqqa, Hassakah and Deir Ezzor.
Protesters hold high the three-star flag of the revolution (Syria’s independence flag). Regime and Baath Party buildings have been attacked; on 4 September, protesters in Suweida destroyed and trampled on a statue of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Both Suweida and Daraa have been hit by general strikes since 20 August, forcing government offices to shut, blocking every road to Damascus and demanding the fall of Assad’s regime. 
The tradition of mass Friday protests, which began in 2011, has returned. On 25 August, demonstrations throughout the country demanded “Accountability for Assad” and “We want the detainees!”, referring to the 130,000 people imprisoned in Assad’s torture chambers or “disappeared”, often since 2011 or even longer. On the following Friday, 1 September, protests grew from hundreds to thousands. “Come on, leave, Bashar!” thousands chanted in central Suweida.
While the regime so far has avoided massive repression of the kind with which it met the 2011 upsurge, there have been clashes and regime killings, particularly in Damascus, Daraa and Aleppo. Following protests in the Daraa town of Nawa on 21 August, when roads were blocked with burning tyres, the regime used gunfire and mortars against protesters and local neighbourhoods. By the end of August, 57 civilians had been arrested just in Daraa, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.
Meanwhile, the regime and Russia continue to bomb opposition-controlled Idlib and regions of Aleppo in the north-west. On 23 August, civilians were killed by Russian air strikes that targeted a water station near the village of Arri; three days later, two schools were bombed.
The immediate trigger for the uprising was the regime’s drastic cuts to fuel subsidies, which more than doubled the cost of fuel. More than 90 percent of the population already lives in poverty, and the rise in the cost of basic goods stands in sharp contrast to the obvious wealth of regime-linked cronies and capitalists. Rising fuel prices and the collapse of the Syrian currency make the cost of everyday goods and transport impossible to afford. One sign held by a demonstrator read: “A hungry people does not eat rocks, it eats its rulers”.
The protesters have no doubts about who is responsible: the regime, which destroyed the country, its cities, its housing, hospitals, schools, water plants and other basic infrastructure, while refusing to reconcile with the peoples of the two regions outside its control, in the north-west and north-east, the latter of which contains significant resources.
Does the uprising have the potential to lead to a new chapter in the Syrian revolution? In fact, it is a continuation of that same revolution, and a rejection of the narrative that the regime crushed it. 
Of course, the regime largely defeated the military aspect of the revolution by relentlessly attacking population centres with cluster bombs, barrel bombs and missiles; by the widespread use of chlorine gas and even sarin; by targeting hospitals, schools, markets, bakeries, apartment buildings and refugee camps, turning Syrian cities into moonscapes; and by the extraordinary scale of incarceration, torture and disappearance. With the aid of Russian bombing, Iranian-backed militia and US facilitation, the regime eventually recaptured most of the regions that had been taken by the armed opposition. 
However, the revolution was never synonymous with armed struggle. In the first six months of 2011, the upsurge was like it is now—mass peaceful demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the regime. From the first days, they were met with massive repression. The large-scale killing of protesters, and the torture of those detained, drove the revolution forward. But this inevitably forced the movement to arm in self-defence—the Free Syrian Army (FSA) arose, forcing the civil movement into the background.
Forcing the opposition to take up arms was a strategic decision by the regime, knowing the rebels could never match the government’s firepower. 
Assad’s other weapon was sectarianism. Throughout 2012, the regime unleashed militia known as shabiha—recruited from Assad’s Alawite community—against Sunni Muslim towns and villages. They massacred dozens or hundreds of people at a time, inflaming a sectarian response among part of the opposition, leading to the rise of Islamist militias alongside the FSA. Later, these included jihadist militias such as Jabhat al-Nusra, which until 2016 was affiliated to al-Qaida.
This allowed the regime to intensify its repression, claiming the mantle of the US-led “war on terror”, and allowed it to claim to be the protector of religious minorities—Christians, the Alawite population of the coast and the Druze—against “jihadi terrorism”, a label it applied to the entire opposition.
The entry of the barbaric Islamic State (ISIS) into Syria from Iraq allowed the regime to further consolidate this narrative, even though both the regime and ISIS spent most of their energy fighting the FSA and other rebels, rather than each other. 
Nevertheless, any time there was a temporary ceasefire, people in the liberated regions poured into the streets chanting the same slogans as they had in 2011. This was the clue that the revolution lived on. 
Can Assad use his two key weapons—repression and sectarianism—to save his regime again?
It may seem surprising that the regime has not thus far fired into the crowds. Partly, the regime may simply hope for some steam to be let off before the movement subsides. After all, it knows from experience that extreme repression can be counterproductive. 
But there is a specific aspect to this uprising that makes direct repression riskier for the regime: its centre is in the minority Druze region of Suweida. The Druze flag today flies next to the flag of the revolution. According to Leia al-Shami, the revolution flag was raised at the tomb of Sultan Prasha Al Atrash, a Druze hero of the anti-colonial struggle against France. 
Not that Suweida was ever quiet or pro-regime. It witnessed many anti-regime outbreaks, but they were not aimed at overthrowing the regime. They broke out in opposition to moves by the regime to violate Suweida’s declared neutrality, by trying to recruit from the region or make the Druze fight the rebels. Druze leaders called on soldiers to desert the army, and opposed deployment of Assad’s military to Suweida, insisting that only local troops protect the region from possible jihadist attack. Protests also erupted in 2015, when Wahid al-Balous, a leader the anti-Assad Sheiks for Dignity, was killed in a car bomb, which locals blamed on the regime.
On 25 July 2018, ISIS entered Suweida and carried out a horrific massacre of 273 Druze civilians. The night before, Syrian army checkpoints around Suweida had been withdrawn, and electricity and telephone services were cut off. This came after Druze leaders rejected pressure to join the Russian-led 5th Corps in the region. While the regime’s complicity only led to more hatred for it, the very danger of ISIS played into the regime narrative of the Sunni extremist danger to minorities. 
Now that the Druze are leading the uprising, the basis of the regime’s narrative is dust. And it will be even more so if the regime employs the kind of terror it used for years against the mostly Sunni-based uprising.
While Suweida and (largely Sunni) Daraa have always had good relations, there is good reason for tension with Idlib in the north-west, currently ruled by the Salvation Front (HTS), an Islamist coalition led by what was once Jabhat al-Nusra, because Nusra harshly oppresses the small local Druze population there.
The revolution, however, is not HTS. Demonstrations in Idlib and rural Aleppo towns such as Atareb raised the cry, “We say to Suweida, we are with you to the death, to Daraa, we are with you to the death!” This was met with a loud response from Suweida: solidarity with Idlib “until we die”. 
“One, one, one, the Syrian people are one!”, is a leading chant throughout the country, sending the message that the people will not let the regime (or the likes of HTS) divide them again. The powerful show of two-way solidarity between the peoples of Suweida and Idlib has the potential to pressure HTS to end its oppression of the Druze. In Idlib and neighbouring Atarib, Druze and Kurdish flags have been raised alongside the revolution flag. 
The Druze are also a powerful minority in Lebanon, which has largely stood in solidarity with the anti-Assad uprising. This might limit the ability of the regime to use Lebanon’s Hezbollah against the Syrian Druze.
The largely Druze population in Israeli-occupied Golan have also come out in the streets demanding the overthrow of Assad. “Oh Hauran [region of southern Syria], we are with you until death!”, chanted the people of the town Maidal Shams. The Golan Druze have never reconciled with Israeli occupation, but have been divided between pro-Assad and pro-opposition sections of the population. So the Druze leadership of the Syrian uprising has the potential to link up with the anti-occupation movement there. 
The Druze minority in Israel itself has traditionally been pro-Israel but has become markedly more alienated since Netanyahu passed the 2018 law declaring the country the “nation-state” of the Jews. The anti-sectarian nature of the current uprising therefore has regional implications.
This also means that Assad cannot rely on even the Alawite heartland. Reportedly, 22 people have been arrested in Latakia following calls from within the Alawite community for Assad’s fall. One of them is Ayman Fares, who released a video statement blaming the regime for the disastrous economic situation, and even accusing Assad and his wife Asma of stealing aid sent to earthquake victims. He was arrested trying to flee to Suweida.
According to Robin Yassin-Kassab, “the regime tried to organise a pro-regime rally in Alawi-majority Tartus, but it didn’t work out. There were almost no volunteers, only a few rich kids in nice cars”.
Leaders of the other large minority, the Kurds, have also declared solidarity with the uprising. Both the Syrian Democratic Council (MSD)—which runs the Autonomous Administration of North Syria, outside regime control, affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—and the rival Kurdistan National Council issued statements supporting the uprising. “The government in Damascus produces no solutions in the face of this dangerous situation at a time of widespread poverty, corruption, and economic crisis”, declared the MSD.
In 2011, Arabs and Kurds across the north joined together in the anti-Assad uprising. However, the Democratic Union Party, which dominate the MSD, took a neutral stance like the Suweida Druze leadership, while carving out its own Kurdish space in the north-east. Once ISIS invaded, its main concern was defending its own territory; it entered a long-term alliance with the US air war on ISIS. 
The common stance of the two Kurdish bodies again shows that neutrality is not an option. In the case of the MSD, however, this has been complicated by an uprising of the Arab population of Deir Ezzor, an Arabic region under the control of the largely Kurdish SDF. The causes are complex, but the Deir Ezzor Arabs are very anti-Assad, suggesting that the regime will not be able to exploit the situation.
This upsurge also features a striking presence of women in leading roles. This is again reminiscent of 2011. Years of regime massacres, rapes, torture and disappearances—along with the descent into armed conflict—drove women from the front lines. But, as Syrian activist Leila Nachawati notes, women remained “a fundamental part of the resistance, and they have continued to be in other elements of life since the civil disobedience movement of 2011”. Pointing to the prominent role of women of the villages and of local Bedouins, Suweida writer Hafez Karkout says the current upsurge has “brought in new segments—all parts of society have gotten involved”. 
All these factors point to a potentially broader movement than in 2011, and one with the hindsight knowledge to avoid past mistakes. This makes it harder for the regime to crush with weaponry or sectarianism. But can it lead to the regime’s overthrow?
We have no crystal ball, and pessimism must be avoided when thousands are potentially putting their lives on the line. At the same time, it is important to note the objective difficulties as well as the strengths.
In the view of the pro-opposition Syria TV, “the ongoing protests may continue and even intensify, but it’s unlikely they will culminate in a revolution like the one in 2011. The current Syrian population is burdened with profound pain, hunger and loss”. The outbreak has been sparked by the regime’s economic measures driving the population further into poverty. Nevertheless, a situation of near destitution, combined with defeat and unimaginable trauma, are often not the best conditions for successful revolution; daily struggle for survival dominates. 
Syria TV adds: “A revolution typically requires the involvement of a middle class to lead it effectively, yet Assad systematically eliminated emerging leaders and depleted Syria of its potential future leaders”. Indeed, the systematic destruction of the intelligentsia, activist leaders, teachers and anyone raising their head was regime policy. Thousands more fled abroad. At the same time, new leaders can arise from movements such as this.
Swiss-Syrian researcher Joseph Daher claims that, while there are “forms of solidarity from other cities”, the movement would threaten the regime only if “there were collaboration between [protesters in] different cities”. This again points to the need for coordination, difficult in conditions of harsh dictatorship and when so much of the previous leadership has been eliminated.
The working class and semi-proletarian suburbs and outskirts of the two major cities—centres of the revolution—have been devastated by years of regime bombing. Meanwhile, the more formal sections of the working class are under totalitarian control and surveillance. While the regime has not yet met the protests with terror bombings, Syrians know what it means to be arrested, jailed or disappeared. 
These are genuine obstacles. But the movement provides hope. Success and failure will also greatly depend on, and in turn impact, the region-wide movement for liberation that began in early 2011.

Michael Karadjis

The new Syrian uprising

Michael Karadjis, who has written extensively about the Syrian civil war, responds to a recent article by veteran Middle East correspondent Patrick Cockburn in the London Review of Books. The piece first appeared at <a href="http://mkaradjis.wordpress.com">mkaradjis.wordpress.com</a>. It has been edited for length.
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The London Review of Books has published Patrick Cockburn’s latest article, “Whose Side is Turkey On?” Now, as I support the struggle of the Syrian Kurds, led by the PYD and its armed militia, the YPG, against ISIS’s genocidal siege, I have no interest in defending Turkey’s shabby role in this, even if I think both the US and Turkey, in their current difference on this issue, are both being totally cynical in their different ways. So this critique will not deal with these issues.
Unfortunately, the angle from which Cockburn criticises Turkey is full of the same contradictions that significant parts of the left espouse, basked in an overall hostility to the Syrian revolution. Valid criticism of Turkey’s sabotage of the defence of Kobani – connected to Turkey’s own oppression of its Kurdish minority – is mixed in with criticism of Turkey for allegedly wanting to help overthrow the Syrian tyranny of Bashar Assad. As if there were something wrong with wanting the overthrow of a tyrant who has burnt his whole country, sending 1.5 million Syrian refugees into Turkey.
Indeed, the fact that Turkey plays an otherwise positive role (for its own reasons which I can’t go into here) in allowing Syrian resistance fighters to cross the border is labelled “facilitating ISIS”, as if the Syrian rebellion has anything to do with ISIS, its vicious enemy. Don’t get me wrong – Turkey may well be facilitating ISIS around the Kurdish regions of the north-east for specifically anti-Kurdish regions, but that simply has nothing to with its rightful facilitation of the anti-Assad rebellion elsewhere.
The Syrian rebellion, based largely among the vast impoverished Sunni Arab majority, has faced a regime that makes ISIS’s tyranny appear amateurish in comparison, and considering how barbaric ISIS is, this is a big claim, yet one that is simply empirically true.
Who arms ‘jihadis’?
Referring to the “coalition” that the US has built to confront ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Cockburn writes: “When the bombing of Syria began in September, Obama announced with pride that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Turkey were all joining the US as military partners against ISIS. But, as the Americans knew, these were all Sunni states which had played a central role in fostering the jihadis in Syria and Iraq.”
Ah, no, they didn’t actually. And just because Cockburn continues to make that assertion, always evidence-free, doesn’t make a non-fact a fact. Actually, only less than 5 percent of ISIS funds came from outside donations at all, and of that, what came from the Gulf certainly didn’t come from the regimes.
“This was a political problem for the US, as Joe Biden revealed to the embarrassment of the administration in a talk at Harvard on 2 October. He said that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had promoted ‘a proxy Sunni-Shia war’ in Syria and ‘poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad – except that the people who were being supplied were al-Nusra and al-Qaida and the extremist element of jihadis coming from other parts of the world’.”
Biden is here expressing the view of US imperialism which has been hostile to the Syrian revolution from Day 1 and hence sought to slander it is a “Sunni jihadist terrorist” war in the same way as does “the left”, except the latter believe they are saying something different from the former. Beats me why.
By pretending that it would like to support the secular or “moderate” rebels, those the media continually calls “Western-backed rebels”, while for years explaining that it could give them nothing because anything it might give them would go to the jihadists, the US was just using code for its hostility to the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA), while offering the pretence that of course it “would like to” back democratic, secular forces if it could.
“The left” then gets it all wrong and criticises the US not for the pretence, but because the left has fallen for the pretence, and then goes on to explain to US imperialism what the latter already agrees with “the left” on – that there can be no such thing as a Syrian “moderate”; if you give a gun to an Arab “moderate” he will inevitably give it to a jihadist, because such oriental folk are not to be trusted.
Who is excluded from the anti-ISIS coalition?
Cockburn continues: “He [Biden] admitted that the moderate Syrian rebels, supposedly central to US policy in Syria, were a negligible military force.”
1. No, the FSA was never central to US policy. Actually, they were central only in as much as the US wanted them destroyed. In recent weeks this has come right out in the open – the US has never trusted the FSA, it is not coordinating with the FSA in its bombing (in fact it is coordinating with Assad, sometimes very closely, and not only against ISIS).
2. “Negligible”. Again, by using the word “admitted”, Cockburn is falling for US propaganda while imagining himself to be criticising it. This of course is precisely the view recently expressed by dozens of top US and UK imperialist officials, military and intelligence leaders, former and current diplomats, CIA heads and countless others, to justify an accommodation with Assad. Before explaining why this is nonsense, let’s just put this together with another of Cockburn’s lines:
“Excluded from this bizarre coalition were almost all those actually fighting ISIS, including Iran, the Syrian army, the Syrian Kurds and the Shia militias in Iraq.”
So let’s look at who Cockburn says are “actually fighting ISIS” in light of this claim about the “negligible” FSA.
1. Iran. OK, yes, since the US began fighting ISIS in Iraq several months ago, Iran entered Iraq as a US ally. This alliance is growing daily, now described as “detente”. The coordination with Iran is open – no-one even tries to deny it any more (unlike the laughable denials about coordination with Assad). Whether Iran has been terribly effective against ISIS or not is hard to say, but this close coordination itself belies Cockburn’s claim that Iran is being “excluded” by the US from the anti-ISIS fight.
2. The Syrian Army. Poor Cockburn. He ought to do the research first. It is well known among virtually all close Syria watchers that the Assad regime and ISIS didn’t fight each other for pretty much an entire year (that is, most of ISIS’s time in Syria) but both instead focused on fighting the FSA and other Syrian rebel groups, indeed often even jointly besieging towns and cities.
Actually, the Syrian regime only began to change policy in mid-2014 and began bombing ISIS in Raqqa in the north-west (from where ISIS had expelled the FSA) at the time the US began bombing ISIS in Iraq – in other words, just like “anti-imperialist” Iran, so likewise, the “resistant” Assad regime only began to bomb ISIS as a quasi-US ally. Since that time, the Assad regime’s score sheet has been several bakeries in Raqqa, along with scores of civilians, but when ISIS moved against the regime’s remaining air base in the north-west, regime “resistance” was a spectacular failure, and ISIS slaughtered several hundred poor Syrian regime cannon fodder following its victory.
3. The Shia militias of Iraq. Cockburn is referring to the Shiite sectarian death squads which are slaughtering and ethnically cleansing Sunni everywhere they go in Iraq, and are frankly no different at all from ISIS.
4. The Syrian Kurds. Yes, the YPG (People’s Defence Units) have valiantly fought ISIS, including in the initial phase in Iraq. But however you look at it, what the Kurds are good at doing is defending majority Kurdish regions from ISIS. ISIS’s base is among Sunni Arabs in both countries, so neither Shiite nor Kurdish forces can do much outside their own areas (except when Shiite sectarian death squads do to Sunnis what ISIS does to Shia). Are they being “excluded”? Well, initially they were in the sense that the US has long called the PYD/YPG’s Turkish-Kurdish partner, the PKK, “terrorist” and refused to cooperate with it in deference to Turkey, preferring to work with the right wing and corrupt Iraqi Kurdish leadership.
However, like it or not “anti-imperialists,” the US engaged in its most intensive bombing of one spot anywhere in the Mideast region since Tora Bora in 2001 during its bombing of ISIS to defend Kobani, bombings which it carried out in direct coordination with the PYD/YPG, while also dropping arms directly to the YPG. We need to deal with facts, not our fantasies about where the PKK or anyone else sits within some “anti-imperialist” geopolitical schema – and these facts make the idea that the Syrian Kurds remain “excluded” absurd.
5. I’m glad Cockburn was smart enough to not add Hezbollah to his list, as others sometimes do in similar silly lists of who they imagine to be “really” fighting ISIS. Hezbollah has spent a great deal of time in western Syria fighting for the Syrian tyranny against the FSA and other mainstream rebels; ISIS has mostly been in the north-east. Thus Hezbollah has barely fought ISIS at all.
So who has effectively fought ISIS?
Apart from the Kurds within the Kurdish regions, who actually has successfully fought ISIS? Oh, that’s right, that would be the “negligible” FSA and allied Syrian rebels. Which kind of makes a mockery of the continual discourse about them being “negligible,” “ineffective,” “disunited” etc., and therefore of no use against ISIS. Perhaps this chatter is aimed precisely at covering the fact that the last people US imperialism would ever want to actually support (as opposed to occasionally give some supportive words to) would be forces leading a popular revolution against a capitalist tyranny.
In July 2013, ISIS assassinated a prominent FSA leader, following months of low-level conflict, and the FSA declared “war” on ISIS. The following month, ISIS declared a campaign to “eradicate filth”, namely, the FSA. The problem between July and December was where the other non-FSA rebels (mostly Islamists of one stripe or another) would stand if the FSA’s war on ISIS moved from ongoing/sporadic to all-out attack, and how such fighting would play out given the absolutely greater degree of killing power possessed by the regime.
However, as ISIS continued to encroach on liberated Syria in late 2013 and impose a vicious new dictatorship, the rest of the revolutionary leaderships could see their revolution was being strangled. On January 3, the weekly Friday protests, coordinated nationally by the civil resistance (yes, it still exists), declared their theme to be that ISIS are foreign criminals that have nothing to do with their revolution.
The very next day – underlining continual coordination, whatever the weaknesses, between the civil and military resistance – the FSA, a new mildly Islamist-leaning coalition in Aleppo (Jaish Mujahideen), and the main militias of the Islamic Front launched a nationwide, coordinated attack on ISIS.
In north-west Syria, one of the revolution’s heartlands (Idlib and Hama), the new coalition of FSA brigades, the Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF), consisting of some 25,000 troops, played the major role in driving ISIS, root and branch, out of that entire region. In Aleppo, the FSA (including SRF) fought alongside Jaish Mujahideen and the Islamic Front and expelled ISIS from that region as well. Further east, the FSA and IF were joined by Nusra in expelling ISIS from Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, that is, pretty much right out of Syria considering ISIS’s negligible presence on the southern front, which is heavily dominated by tens of thousands of FSA troops, and in Damascus, by the FSA and IF. Only in Raqqa did ISIS put all its energy into making a comeback and re-took the city as their capital, but failed to re-take Deir Ezzor.
After ISIS’s spectacular victory in Mosul in June 2014, it was re-energised with tons of advanced US weapons it had seized from the Iraqi army, and its victory there had a magnetic effect on jihadists who previously were less committed. From June, ISIS launched a new attack on FSA/IF/Nusra-held Deir Ezzor, and the city put up an epic resistance. The Assad regime aided ISIS by bombing the city. The rebels, completely surrounded, called for arms drops, announcing they could not hold out forever. The US, like in the last three years, made sure nothing like that occurred. ISIS seized the town and the rebels fled, but local Sunni tribes who had opposed ISIS rose up in rebellion, which was crushed by ISIS who then murdered 700 tribal opponents. An ongoing resistance in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor regions by local Sunni, the “White Shroud” rebellion, kills ISIS scum in small-scale hits. The revolution is ongoing, taking many forms.
More recently, ISIS did appear around Damascus. The united rebel forces expelled them root and branch. Despite being expelled from Homs, ISIS has made a comeback in eastern Homs province. The city itself, of course, surrendered to the regime earlier this year – if you take a look at footage of Homs, you can understand that there are only so many Hiroshimas that a population can withstand.
Let’s be absolutely clear – the entire discourse about a “negligible” FSA that is “ineffective” against ISIS is bogus, and is propounded for a reason. Only a fool would deny the serious problems – political, material, coordination-wise etc. – that do exist for the FSA and the revolution’s leadership more generally. There is no reason to romanticise – although I’m not aware of any supporter of the revolution that does.
However, only someone who has simply ignored this real history would deny that the only forces in the entire region that have actually pushed back ISIS from a very significant amount of territory – much of Syria in fact – and crucially, pushed ISIS out of Sunni Arab regions, has been the FSA and its rebel allies, not anyone on Cockburn’s list.

The new Syrian uprising

Who is fighting ISIS in Syria?

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