Erdoğan’s attack on democratic rights sparks mass protests in Türkiye

Resistance returned to the streets of Türkiye following the 19 March arrest of İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political rival. İmamoğlu’s university degree had already been annulled, preventing him from standing in the 2028 presidential election. He was subsequently arrested on charges of terrorism and corruption by a politically motivated court ruling. Mass protests have since erupted nationwide to protect the right to free elections and democracy.

Millions of people have participated in protests in most Turkish provinces. Students and young people, who have grown up under the rule of Erdoğan, are the main drivers of the movement and have organised a boycott of government-aligned businesses. The police have arrested thousands and imprisoned hundreds, focusing their attention on socialists, leftists and unionists. Prosecutors are now on the hunt for those encouraging the boycott. Defying the repression, actions continue.

Red Flag’s Can Yilmaz interviewed the leader of the Socialist Workers’ Party (SEP) Güneş Gümüş to discuss the developments and the left’s role in them.

--------------------

President Erdoğan has been in power for more than twenty years. How much has he changed Turkish politics and what’s behind the current crisis?

Since coming to power in 2002, Erdoğan has gradually built an authoritarian regime. He already controls the state apparatus—the military, police, judiciary, media and universities. Thousands of dissidents are currently in prison. Any serious opposition voice can be jailed simply by accusing them of “terrorism”. But the AKP’s [the conservative Justice and Development Party, which Erdoğan leads] latest move represents a qualitative leap in building an authoritarian regime.

Despite past interruptions by coups, Turkey had an 80-year history of multi-party democracy and a tradition of governments changing through elections. In the 2024 local elections, the AKP lost almost all major municipalities. Most state resources are now under CHP [the Republican People’s Party, a secular nationalist party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of Türkiye] control. Some CHP figures became serious rivals to Erdoğan. Turkish society is dynamic—young people have largely broken from the AKP, and its social base is shrinking.

These concerns drove the AKP to a kind of coup. What they are now trying to establish is a fully authoritarian regime—a Putin-style system where elections exist only on paper. A silent society under an autocracy with opposition leaders sidelined: this is their goal.

How sizeable are the demonstrations and how severely are they being repressed? What is the political significance of these developments?

Millions have taken to the streets. The driving force of the protests is university students and youth. For some time, young people have been leaving the country. Injustice, unemployment, impoverishment, repression, favouritism—this is the only reality for someone in their early 20s. They’ve seen no government other than Erdoğan’s, and things keep getting worse Eventually, this angry generation exploded.

No-one—including us—predicted the protests would grow so quickly. Erdoğan has not yet managed to fully establish the authoritarian regime he desires because strong pockets of resistance have always emerged. This wave of mass protests came as a rebellion of a generation previously thought to have been subdued. The moment the first police barricade was breached, a psychological threshold was crossed—and Erdoğan was forced to step back.

The protest wave, led by the three largest cities, has put pressure on the bourgeois opposition. Police were forced to retreat in many places, but where protester numbers increased or they attempted to break through barricades, police responded with extreme violence. Erdoğan also employed another tactic: every morning for a week, protesters’ homes were raided, and arrests were made daily. Using media power, the protests and protesters were criminalised. In total, 2,600 people were detained, more than 300 imprisoned, and dozens placed under house arrest.

The most important outcome so far is that Erdoğan, unexpectedly, had to hit the brakes. A trustee couldn’t be appointed to the İstanbul Municipality. Some of Erdoğan’s planned moves may also have been postponed—we’ll see in time. But we know this: Erdoğan is determined to go all the way.

How does this moment compare to previous instances of resistance, such as the 2013 Gezi Park protests?

University students are playing a much more decisive role in the struggle. The average age is much younger. In 2013, the broader opposition was more self-confident, and people of all ages participated in the protests. Neighbourhood-based local protests were widespread—even small cities saw large demonstrations. Today, fear is more prevalent, so middle-aged and older generations are more hesitant. Still, over 2 million people joined a large, low-risk CHP-organised demonstration in İstanbul.

In 2013, Erdoğan’s polarisation strategy worked—half the country was still behind him, the other half on the streets. Today, the AKP’s support base has shrunk significantly, and Erdoğan is even struggling to consolidate that. In 2013, police violence was more brutal—10 protesters were killed. This time, despite pressure to crack down, police have been relatively softer in some cases.

The socialist left was larger in 2013 and had more influence on the movement. Today, right-wing Kemalist influence is stronger among the youth. Still, socialist groups—including the SEP’s youth organisation Marxist Thought Communities—remain influential in protest and boycott committees. Middle East Technical University, a historical stronghold of the socialist left, has had a nationwide impact once again.

Back then, pessimism wasn’t as deep. But the extraordinary years that followed 2013 led to the withdrawal of a generation and weakened the socialist left. Now, a new generation has emerged.

The key continuity between 2013 and 2025 is the defence of democratic rights against AKP authoritarianism. The defence of secularism—and the image of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—continues. Another continuity is the absence of the working-class movement from the struggle. Despite some significant labour strikes today, they remain localised and focused on economic demands, not political ones.

The class dynamic also plays a major role in why the youth are so determined and at the forefront. They don’t believe they have a future in Turkey and are resisting the transformation of their country into a typical Middle Eastern-style tyranny. Democratic rights and freedoms are among their most basic demands.

What’s the role of the left? How has your group the SEP and other socialist groups been active?

The left has significantly shrunk and lost influence over the past decades due to ideological defeats and pressure from the regime. Identity politics became central, leaving the working class vulnerable to either Islamism or despair. With a few exceptions, universities are now dominated by state-supported fascist groups.

Still, the radical left has influence in a few key universities and youth centres. It has an outsized impact compared to its numerical strength. For example, the first protest that sparked the uprising was organised by socialists, including us. We play critical roles in organising university boycotts and unifying the student movement in city centres.

Socialists have played decisive roles at key moments and places, but we need to build a united front to sustain momentum. We must bring in the power of the working class and the grievances of the poor. We are working within the unions where we are active to build pressure for participation in the movement.

What other organised political groups are taking part in the actions? Is there a clear leadership to the movement?

The movement is heterogeneous and scattered. On the streets, you can find ultra-nationalist youth, Kemalists, and left-leaning students united by their hatred for Erdoğan’s regime. Almost all socialist and left groups are involved. But there’s one critical exception: the leadership of the Kurdish political movement. They’ve been engaged in negotiations with the state regarding disarmament of the PKK [the Kurdistan Workers’ Party]. Within this framework, they and the socialist groups aligned with them, including the unions they influence, have deliberately stayed out of the protests.

Another group absent from the demonstrations was the Communist Party of Turkey. Despite the massive nature of the revolt, they initially avoided joining, making political statements to justify their inaction. But under grassroots pressure, they were eventually forced to participate in a controlled way.

It seems the question of what to do next is causing some debate. What are people arguing about where to go from here?

SEP advocates for strengthening the boycott committees at universities, establishing local committees in neighbourhoods and workplaces, and building a non-bureaucratic organisational structure that sustains the movement through concrete campaigns.

The economic crisis is the country’s most fundamental issue. The movement needs to incorporate economic demands. Also, 301 students, leftists and unionists are still in prison, with hundreds under house arrest. We need solidarity networks and a campaign for their release.

While a general strike is not realistic at this point, it’s vital to appeal to the working class and embed demands that resonate with them. Right now, consumer boycotts are the most widespread form of protest among the public. CHP is calling for boycotts of companies close to the AKP. On social media, calls for boycotting shopping are gaining traction.

People are discussing how Turkey lacks oil or other internal resources to finance authoritarianism, making it vulnerable to consumer boycotts. But we argue that producer strikes, direct action, neighbourhood and workplace committees, and organised struggle—not consumer boycotts—will ultimately determine the outcome.

In what direction do you think the socialist movement and the labour movement should go?

The anger of the youth, the suffering of the working class, and the Kurdish people’s desire for freedom all point to the need for a revolutionary solution. Existing left organisations are bureaucratic, closely tied to the system and, unfortunately, have lost their class perspective and character. As a result, they can’t go beyond defending the democratic space or develop more advanced strategies for struggle. Now that the masses are beginning to push beyond those limits, we must organise a new revolutionary generation out of this movement.