The Women, Life, Freedom uprising has profoundly shaken the foundations of Iran’s Islamic Republic. Regional defeats, including the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the fall of the dictator Assad, have further weakened the regime in Tehran. With the social and economic crisis into which the country is sinking, the very survival of the Islamic Republic is at stake.
With galloping hyperinflation, the collapse of the national currency, gas and electricity shortages, regular production stoppages and untimely closures of factories and administrations, the entire economy has been hit by an unprecedented crisis. Although Iran has the world’s second-largest gas reserves and third-largest oil reserves, the population lacks everything: more than 60 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Unpaid wages are on the increase.
In 2024, 2,396 demonstrations and 169 strikes were recorded. Due to censorship, these figures are undoubtedly lower than the reality. These protests by workers of all categories (teachers, nurses, manual workers, municipal employees, pensioners, etc.) and from all sectors, including the strategic petrochemicals industry, took place in all 31 regions of the country. The demands concerned wages, social protection, pensions, employment contracts and the abolition of daily working hours.
The Islamic Republic, a capitalist and theocratic dictatorship, responded with systematic brutality. The regime’s first weapon is to continue to ban the right to organise and form trade unions. The authorities are seeking to prevent any structuring or coordination of social protest. Worker activists are constantly being arrested and sentenced. Often dismissed from their jobs, they are subjected to intimidation and various forms of pressure regularly during their detention and when they are released.
Faced with regional defeats, the social crisis and the struggles, the Islamic Republic has tried in recent weeks to flex its muscles by conducting military manoeuvres designed to dissuade the colonialist state of Israel and US imperialism from attacking Iran. At the same time, it has deployed Basij militias in the streets to create a climate of fear—a clear message to those who constantly challenge the authorities.
But these gesticulations do not put an end to mobilisations, acts of civil disobedience, or collective or individual resistance. The assassination in broad daylight of two Supreme Court judges on 18 January testifies to the fragility of the government. Known for their summary trials of opponents and directly responsible for the execution of many political prisoners, no-one will mourn the deaths of Judges Razini and Moghisseh.
Every time the regime fears for its survival, its violence against its opponents becomes more ferocious. In 2024, the Islamic Republic murdered more than 900 prisoners. And since the northern autumn, the authorities have even stepped up the pace, executing more than three prisoners a day. 
Kurds and Baluchis are the first victims, demonstrating the systemic racism of the regime. Fifty-one prisoners of conscience are on death row. Campaigns against the death penalty are organised from inside the prisons themselves, before spreading outside the country. This is particularly the case for Varisheh Moradi and Pakhshan Azizi, two Kurdish activists for whom various appeals and petitions are circulating. A well-attended one-day general strike was called in Kurdistan on 22 January to protest against their sentencing.
Against the capitalist and obscurantist regime of the mullahs, which is showing many signs of weakness, it is important to develop support here and now for those who are fighting for social justice, democracy, gender equality and the defence of national and religious minorities. 
It is high time to put an end to the Islamic Republic. To achieve this, the youth, women, workers and peoples of Iran need international solidarity. The fall of the regime through a popular victory and without imperialist interference would be a tremendous encouragement for all the peoples of the region and the world.
Reprinted from InternationalViewpoint.org

Babak Kia

Iran: Storm warning for the Islamic Republic

US President Donald Trump has declared his intention to ethnically cleanse Gaza of its Palestinian population. Trump outlined his genocidal vision during a grotesque press conference, standing alongside a smirking Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has overseen the massacre of at least 50,000 people in Gaza, and who has an International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued against him for war crimes.
Trump justified his calls for the annihilation of the Palestinian people from their homeland by describing the complete devastation that has been wrought on Gaza—devastation caused by the man grinning next to him, and by the US itself which has supplied Israel with the weaponry to destroy Gaza’s homes, hospitals, schools and all other civilian infrastructure.
As if ethnic cleansing wasn’t bad enough, Trump added his own billionaire-parasite twist, declaring that the US would “own” Gaza, and that he would turn it into “the Riviera of the Middle East”. Republican Congresswoman Nancy Mace put it succinctly: “Let’s turn Gaza into Mar-a-Lago”. 
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has kept his knee bent before the hard-right US president by refusing to condemn these open calls for genocide. Albanese said he “would not give a daily commentary on statements by the US President”. Even spineless world leaders who have been lining up to kiss Trump’s arse, like the UK’s Keir Starmer, have at least verbally rebuked his calls for ethnic cleansing. Not so Albanese, who is setting new standards for pathetic capitulation to the far right. 
Trump’s open support for the total removal of Palestinians from Gaza puts much of the political and media establishment in Australia and around the world in a bit of a quandary. They continued to support Israel through sixteen months of its genocide in Gaza, no matter how many children were massacred. They have dehumanised the Palestinian people and engaged in an escalating campaign of slandering, sacking and repressing those who speak up for the Palestinians, from journalists and academics to students and protest organisers. But most of this has happened under the official pretence that Israel was “defending itself”, accompanied by weasel words from former US President Joe Biden and Albanese pretending that they wanted peace and a two-state solution, and a compliant media who presented this fairytale as though it were real. Netanyahu knows this game well; he knows that to get away with genocide it’s best to deny that is what you’re doing.
Trump has shattered that pretence. He has said out loud what has been Israel and the US’s policy all along, obvious to anyone who wanted to see, yet officially denied: wiping out the Palestinian people. That’s what the last sixteen months have been about, and the US and Australia have provided the arms to do it.
The media’s reaction has been mixed, reflecting this quandary of how to deal with a US president who makes it harder to justify the rotten system we live in. Rupert Murdoch’s Daily Telegraph ran an opinion piece titled “Can Trump’s plan to level Gaza finally bring peace?”. Pondering about whether genocide equals peace was a bridge too far for most, though, who have instead tried to reassure us that Trump’s statements are “outlandish” and unrealisable. 
But the genocide in Gaza is not outlandish. It has been happening. And Trump’s statements have effectively ripped up the ceasefire deal and given Netanyahu the green light to resume the slaughter in coming months. They must be stopped.

Josh Lees

Trump spells out plan for ethnic cleansing in Gaza

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship. This is the sixth in his series of reports, the complete list of which can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a> section.
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Entering Lebanon from Syria, the first noticeable shift is the greenery of the villages, mountains and plains. They contrast starkly with the largely bare central and southern parts of Syria, which have a sparse palette of ochres and greys—a testament to hard times. 
It wasn’t always this way in Syria. Hundreds of thousands of trees were felled during the civil war, the wood used as winter fuel. A report by Dutch NGO PAX estimates that nearly 40 percent of Syria’s trees have been lost since the revolution began in 2011. In eastern Ghouta—the green belt around Damascus that includes Harasta, Douma and other sites of bitter fighting—the figure is around 80 percent. The same report also describes a pre-war Daraa possessing “lush riverbanks and parks”, which reads today like some sort of sick joke. 
Returning to Lebanon is a shock to the political and physical senses. In the past, it’s been hard to stomach the country’s endemic poverty, governmental failures and perpetual exiling of its youth in search of better opportunities. All of that remains. But having spent so much time in the ruins of Assad’s Syria, Lebanon seems almost idyllic.
Lebanon has been through tough times, with the latest war between Israel and Hezbollah the cherry on top after years of economic and political crisis. Yet a new government has been elected, led by figures partially independent from the corrupt crony capitalism of the country’s traditional elites. Though the left remains sceptical that there will be much change, there is at least an opening to push.
While many Syrians are hopeful for their country’s future, the legacy of 54 years of totalitarian rule hangs over the place like a dark cloud. The drive back to Beirut from Damascus is a final reminder of the lingering bitterness. Each man sharing the car takes a turn explaining the crimes of the regime, the terrible losses of cousins, uncles and aunts, the kidnapping of friends by the security services. 
“Nobody in the world has ever invented means of killing like Assad”, says our driver. “I mean, they created <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ictvq6r2N4">a press</a> for human bodies! Rooms of acid, salt!” The mood is black, emotionally charged. No pill or cognitive-behavioural trick can mend these deep psychological scars. It will take time, social reconstruction on more humane lines, and more time.
Three of the four men also complain of their treatment at the hands of the Lebanese. “They looked down on us, as if we were dogs”, spits one. “I hope to god that one day they experience what we did, so we can show them how it feels to be abused in your time of need”, swears another. The younger man in the backseat next to me shoots a wry smile. He tells me later that he hasn’t found Lebanon so bad, having worked for the past eight years in a high-end French patisserie in downtown Beirut. But he’s heard many such stories and rightly sympathises with those who tell them. 
I glean from this and other conversations that there is a clear class dynamic within the Syrian refugee community. Those who are educated—and who tend to be younger and wealthier—have built fairly happy lives in the relative freedom that Lebanon and Europe offer. But more blue-collar refugees and migrants have found the going much harder, typically shunned towards low-paid and exploitative industries like construction, cleaning and domestic labour.
A later interview with Omar, a Syrian refugee who has built a life for himself working in construction and landscaping in the sleepy village of Batloun, starts awkwardly. Knowing I’m Lebanese, he initially emphasises how thankful he is that the country has tolerated the presence of so many Syrians. “We’ve nearly doubled the population of your country”, he says. “I can understand why there is some hostility towards us.” This is only a small exaggeration: the Lebanese government estimated that, at one point, around 1.5 million Syrian refugees lived in this country of just over 5 million. (It puts Australia’s annual refugee intake of around 15,000 into perspective.)
When it becomes clear that I am sympathetic to the Syrian plight, Omar opens up. “The treatment we get here is very mixed. Many deal with us fairly, but others act as if we are an underclass ... Often, it is shaped by their political affiliations.” He cites an example of a Lebanese man pulling his daughter away from him as he entered a shop, as if he were a rabid dog. His agitation is obvious. “How can you teach a child to act that way to another human being?”, he asks. Omar goes on to explain that the sections of the community aligned with the Lebanese political party Hezbollah tend to be far more hostile towards Syrians. One even threatened to turn him over to the Syrian secret services. 
Omar’s tale is a sad one: he was forced to flee Syria after spending two months camping in the wilderness to avoid being arrested by security forces. They had identified him as an oppositionist—and falsely branded him as al-Nusra—after he refused to join the security forces when the revolution began.
“I was part of the revolution; how could I work against my people?!”, he asks rhetorically. He lost 21 of his relatives to the regime’s counter-revolution, but still thinks it was worth it. With a huge smile, he tells us that he will soon visit his family for the first time in twelve years, though he’s not planning to stay permanently as work remains hard to find.
While many refugees of working age found ways to live relatively normal lives in Lebanon, or continued the perilous journey towards Europe, many others were unable to do so. For the old, young, orphaned or sick, the enormous refugee camps set up in the Bekaa Valley were the only option. More than 300,000 people languished in plastic tents through the freezing winters and scorching summers. Similar institutions were set up in Türkiye and Jordan. “I feel sorry for the poor children raised in these places”, Omar says.
It was hard to leave Syria, to process the gut-wrenching feeling that I was abandoning a people who have struggled alone for far too long. The governments of the world watched while the country burned, more fearful of revolutionary victory and regional instability than the regime’s brutal repression. 
Syrians were also abandoned by most of the Stalinist and anarchist groups internationally, who disgraced themselves either by slandering the revolutionaries or, in many cases, openly defending Assad. By relying on familiar narratives about imperial intervention rather than grappling with the complex reality of a popular revolution, they found themselves on the wrong side of the barricades, siding with unimaginable state violence against some of the bravest people on earth. 
The fall of Assad, along with the collapse of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance this year, is yet another major turning point in a region scarred by two decades of brutal US wars and occupations, revolutions and counter-revolutions, growing sectarian tensions and violent Israeli expansionism. Western imperialism has played a key role in these tumultuous events, leaving millions dead or injured in the wake of their barbarous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and, of course, Palestine. 
But in Syria, as with Yemen, Bahrain and Egypt, the West was a secondary player. And while the historic crimes of colonialism are important to recall, the immediate causes of the social and economic crises that plague the region are overwhelmingly to be found in the exploitative, bigoted and sectarian politics of the regional capitalist classes. 
As the bitter debates over the Syrian revolution proved, making sense of these complex and contradictory dynamics, and even more importantly, championing those fighting for liberation, has not been easy. But lest those who got it right feel too complacent, we should remember that we were unable to offer any practical solidarity—a painful failure and an urgent challenge for the future.
By rights, the Syrian people now deserve a global effort to facilitate reconstruction and the alleviation of their country’s many social and economic crises. That would be the minimum reparations for the world’s indifference to their suffering. But in this despicable capitalist world, it is more likely that there will be a mad scramble for the country’s resources; Syria as the ramshackle house on the corner bought only to be bulldozed by developers seeking a quick buck. 
Syria’s new rulers, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, will be another challenge, being both right wing and highly pragmatic. Thus far, they have been keen to prove their commitment to international norms, including the free market. They have also refused to make any statement of support for the Palestinians and have instead called for their militias to be disarmed. Even worse, they seem set to deport an Egyptian man, himself a member of HTS, for the crime of calling for the fall of his country’s military dictatorship. All of this suggests that it is far from certain that the new Syria will fulfil the dreams of the revolutionaries who continue to fight.
Yet pessimism is a privilege reserved for those who stand aside from the battle for life, freedom and economic justice that the exploited and the oppressed have waged for millennia. Right now, there are tens of thousands of Syrians fighting to wrest their rights from the local and international capitalists who have denied them for so long. Far from feeling defeated, their organising efforts are just getting started. On WhatsApp and Facebook, there are constant updates about meetings, protests and strikes across the country. Friends in Suwayda and Daraa are busy replanting thousands of trees lost in the calamities of the past fifteen years, a quietly courageous investment in an unknown future.
These brave comrades—the socialists, unionists and students determined to shape their country’s future—deserve our solidarity and love in the coming period.

Omar Hassan

Syria’s future is uncertain, but the organising is only getting started

Palestinians in Gaza wildly celebrated the initial announcement of the ceasefire agreement. But their hopes for a better future after 15 months of hell and misery turned to trepidation when Israel immediately unleashed a further furious campaign of airstrikes on civilian targets.
It was a clear message of Israeli intentions. Yes, a ceasefire might be coming, but Israel will maintain and enforce its military control over the Palestinian population of the enclave. Gaza will remain an open-air prison camp on which Israel will unleash hell whenever it suits its interests. 
The ceasefire, if it holds, will of course be a relief after all the suffering. However, the complex three-stage deal is fragile, and the Israelis may well try to disrupt or sabotage it.
The Israeli far right and fascist forces are furious about any pause in the genocidal war. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich demanded “complete victory”—endless war against the Palestinian population and the destruction of any hopes they have of achieving a state of their own. The far right is demanding that the attacks resume after the six-week first phase of the ceasefire deal and the release of hostages. 
The lives of the people of Gaza will be only minimally improved by the ceasefire. On top of the tens of thousands killed, and the much greater numbers wounded, the whole infrastructure of Gaza has been laid waste—hospitals, schools, housing, roads, the sewerage system, agriculture, bakeries, electricity and water supplies. There are no jobs. Disease and famine stalk the streets. The bombs might stop, but none of this will change. 
Gazans will be allowed no genuine democratic rights under the ceasefire agreement. There will be no free elections. A military dictatorship is to be imposed upon them.
The US government wants an interim international body, made up largely of troops from “reliable” authoritarian Arab states, to police Gaza, followed by the appointment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to run the show. The PA is attempting to establish its credentials with the US and Netanyahu for a role as a reliable Vichy-style regime in Gaza by waging a brutal offensive in the West Bank to destroy all democratic opposition to its dictatorship.
Having ravaged Gaza, Israel now has the green light from the US to step up its assault on the West Bank, which is the main game for the Zionists. The Israelis are rapidly expanding their illegal settlements and relentlessly driving Palestinians from their land. To make their intentions crystal clear, immediately after the ceasefire was announced, a murderous crew of Zionist settlers were released from detention and unleashed on the West Bank population. 
US imperialism has been the decisive winner of this prolonged war, even more so than Israel. The US’s rival Iran has been much weakened—its strategic position in the Middle East severely set back.
Iran’s key ally Hezbollah has taken major blows militarily and politically. Hezbollah’s leadership was decimated by Israeli attacks, and much of its military apparatus destroyed. And after long months of political stalemate in a further attempt to isolate Hezbollah, a new US-backed president and prime minister have been installed in Lebanon.
The monstrous Assad regime in Syria, another key piece of the supposed “axis of resistance”, has been overthrown. Hamas has been battered, the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq weakened.
The US ruling class and political establishment, not simply Trump and Biden, appear to have laid down the law to Netanyahu that Israel had achieved all it could out of the war on Gaza. The US was for moving on after its victory in the Middle East and focusing back on the main game for US imperialism: preparing for a future war with China.
A series of utterly hypocritical Western leaders came out declaring the ceasefire in Gaza should be the prelude to a two-state solution for the Palestinians. This is a monumental facade to make it appear that they have a shred of moral decency and care about human rights.
These capitalist politicians know full well that the Zionist state is never going to accept a Palestinian state being set up alongside Israel. And Western leaders have never been prepared to seriously take on Israel to obtain even an ounce of justice for the Palestinians. A powerful Israeli state very much serves Western imperialism’s strategic interests in the vital Middle East.
The radical international movement in support of Palestine that emerged over the last 15 months is one of the few positive developments to come out of this terrible genocide. We have seen the largest and most sustained protests ever across the Western world in support of Palestinian rights. Political opinions have shifted substantially, especially amongst a layer of younger people. 
The movement can’t let up the fight. Even if the ceasefire holds, it will not resolve the terrible problems facing the Palestinian people.
The movement must demand as a very minimum that the Western powers, which backed Israel, pay for the rebuilding of Gaza with no strings attached. This must begin immediately. Food, medical supplies, fuel and temporary housing need to be poured in.
The sick and wounded must be allowed to leave Gaza for proper medical treatment. Palestinian refugees must be allowed into Australia and granted immediate asylum. 
The Israeli army must be immediately withdrawn from all of Gaza. Israeli raids in the West Bank have to end now. Netanyahu and the whole Israeli war cabinet should be arrested and tried for genocide. The Australian government should break all ties with Israel. We must not forget what happened in this genocidal war.
But more than that, the movement needs to be fighting for genuine social and national freedom for the Palestinian people, from the river to the sea. The only solution worth fighting for is a completely democratic society in which all the people of historic Palestine, whatever their religion or no religion, whatever their ethnic background, have genuinely equal rights.
The pro-Palestine movement also needs to address and debate out the road forward for liberation. How can the freedom of the Palestinian people be achieved in the face of the military might of the Zionist state with its strident backing from the US and other Western imperialist states such as Australia?
It is clear after all the horrors of the last 15 months that we can’t rely on capitalist politicians of whatever political hue, Democrat or Republican, Labor or Liberal. There is no point begging them to be humane or electing the supposed “lesser evil” alternative, which always turns out, once in government, to be simply another form of evil.
The whole Western capitalist order needs to be challenged. That means building a socialist movement with a strong base of support amongst the working class.
That is not some simple or easy task. It is not going to happen overnight but it is the only hope for genuine liberation.
In the Middle East, the so-called “axis of resistance”, which sections of the Palestine movement looked to, has been revealed as a complete paper tiger. It was never willing nor able to deliver meaningful support for the Palestinians, let alone defeat Israel.
The axis of resistance was simply a mechanism to protect the reactionary Iranian state’s interests. It was not about standing up for the rights of the Palestinians and the oppressed and exploited of the Middle East.
Many decades of experience have also amply demonstrated than none of the capitalist regimes of the region, for all their at times radical pretensions, have ever been prepared to wage an all-out fight against imperialism and for the liberation of Palestine. Such a struggle would necessitate the mobilisation of the mass of workers and the oppressed, which would inevitably threaten the wealth and power of the ruling class elite.
As well, guerrilla struggle, no matter how heroic, is not going to be able to defeat the might of the Zionist state backed to the hilt by US imperialism. This was the approach for decades of first the old Palestine Liberation Organisation under Yasser Arafat and now Hamas, but without success.
The only force capable of decisively rocking the whole of the Arab world and bringing revolution to the very borders of Israel is the working class. The interests of the Palestinians are closely aligned with the workers of the surrounding states suffering under brutal dictatorial capitalist rule.
The 2011 Arab Spring revolt showed the potential for mass uprisings to sweep across the region. Next time round, the revolts will need to go much further, not just toppling dictators like Mubarak in Egypt, but workers taking power directly into their own hands. That will mean rebuilding a fighting revolutionary left that is prepared to take the struggle all the way.

Mick Armstrong

Gaza ceasefire: keep up the fight for a free Palestine

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship. This is the sixth in his series of reports, the complete list of which can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a> section.
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“Our public servants are a national asset”, read one placard from a strike by government employees in Suwayda last week. “No to the unjust decree, No to the sacking of our workers”, read another. 
Around 600 people had gathered to protest against the dismissal of hundreds of public servants by administrators appointed by the new government led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The crowd reflected the full spectrum of working-class life—from nurses, doctors and administrators from the public health system to telecommunications workers, agricultural workers and employees of state-run factories. Importantly, it included those who had been fired but also those still employed by the state. The latter haven’t been paid in nearly two months and so joined not only in solidarity but also to raise their own demands.
Last week, hundreds of workers occupied the department of public health in Daraa. This was in response to the HTS-run department announcing plans to halve its employee numbers, from roughly 1800 to nearly 900. They were joined by workers in the local tourism, culture and treasury offices, who face similar cuts. 
Accounts from the Daraa demonstration conveyed the workers’ fury and sense of betrayal: “We served in the most difficult times of war, and did not abandon our post during the pandemic ... We stuck to our jobs for years, despite salaries shrinking to no more than $20 a month”, one worker explained. 
The cuts are coming as part of an effort by the interim government to resolve what it calls the “obesity” and inefficiency of the public sector. “[The government] does not have a magic wand to solve Syria’s economic problems”, said the caretaker finance minister, echoing managers of austerity drives from time immemorial. 
What they do have is a very large axe, and their target is to slash 300,000 jobs from a total government workforce of around 900,000. If allowed to proceed, this plan will leave many families without any source of income, increasing the poverty rate in one of the poorest countries on Earth. 
This reactionary measure is being dressed up in revolutionary, anti-Assadist rhetoric. The government claims that cuts are a necessary response to the corruption and mismanagement of the old regime. For instance, managers would create fake jobs for their friends and families regardless of their qualifications or even whether a job opening existed in the first place. The lucky few with deep connections (here, they are called wasta) could have as many as six salaries from such means. 
Another argument that has appeared on social media and other unofficial channels is that anyone hired in the last ten years is, by definition, a supporter of the old regime. But this is a profoundly cynical perspective. As one working-class man said to me in Damascus: “[HTS] were living the good life in Idlib, earning good money sent to them via the Gulf [states] ... so it’s easy for them to blame every other Syrian who had to work for the disgusting regime to survive. But what were we supposed to do?” 
The explanation for these moves is that HTS has a clear and reactionary economic vision for the country: “[Syria] will be a free-market system based on competition”, declared the head of the Damascus Chambers of Commerce after meeting with senior government figures, including the interim economy minister. As well as sacking hundreds of thousands of workers, they have made moves to open Syrian markets to foreign trade and have cut subsidies on bread. The government has faced criticism for these decisions, including that, as a transitional government, it should be making only emergency, as opposed to strategic, policy decisions.
For now, the HTS-led government is enjoying a grace period, still basking in the glow of its role in defeating the Assad regime. This is reinforced by the growing support Ahmed al-Sharaa and his team receive from international ruling class figures in the Middle East and the West.
It’s also reinforced by the important improvements in life for many Syrians. The first, and most commented on, is the capacity “to breathe”—that is, to speak freely about life and politics. Then there is the freedom of movement across a country once occupied by a regime every bit as brutal as any foreign power. Damascus is filled with people from Syria’s north who haven’t visited their families in over a decade. I was constantly asked for directions to the touristic areas, quietly comforted that others were just as disoriented by the labyrinthine streets.
On an economic front, the abolition of government checkpoints, where farmers would pay substantial bribes to get their goods through, means that the price of many fruits and vegetables has fallen substantially. The opening of borders to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan has also helped. Ahmad, my driver in Suwayda, informed me that, at one point, a kilo of bananas cost 50,000 Syrian lira. But they’re coming in from Lebanon now, so “you won’t pay more than 14,000”. 
Still, as one hotel employee explained despairingly, “It doesn’t help us much if prices go down a bit, if our wages are still worth nothing”. Syrians earn their income in lira, so the more than 99 percent collapse in the value of the Syrian currency since 2011 has devastated their living standards. She expressed cautious hope about the future when pressed, but her profound anxiety about the cost of living made it hard for her to revel fully in the fall of Assad.
Mohammed, a young man who works in Daraa as a salesperson for a medical company, came across similarly. While thanking God for the fall of the regime, he kept coming back to the challenges of daily life. “Never once have I been paid my full wage on pay day, because I’m always getting advance payments to cover costs”, he explained, somewhat embarrassed. “My whole life is debt; I can’t catch up.” 
To address these fundamental issues, al-Sharaa initially promised a 400 percent increase in the wages of public sector workers. The finance minister subsequently clarified that “this increase will include workers whose qualifications are appropriate for the job, while others will remain on the same salary”. The current public sector salary is about US$15 a month, woefully inadequate even for basic survival.
Then there is the housing crisis. Syria has a severe shortage of livable homes, a product of the extreme destruction wrought on entire cities and towns across the country. The problem will get worse as exiles and refugees return in greater numbers. Syrian Facebook group INT, which I’m told is a moderated and reliable source of news, regularly features reports of disputes between returning Syrian exiles and the internally displaced refugees who have been occupying their vacant homes, in many cases for over a decade. 
There’s a desperate need for more affordable housing. But property developers and tycoons are not in the business of providing affordable housing—they are interested in maximising profits. Nearly a decade ago, there were <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230602063845/https:/www.refworld.org/docid/591313c04.html">reports</a>
that Assad had plans to rebuild damaged parts of Damascus. But rather than restoring popular neighbourhoods to their former glory (or even just improving them), the plan was to deploy private capital to create luxury housing for the super-rich. The project stalled due to the ongoing turmoil in Syria. If foreign investors are given free rein, without any government planning, control or oversight, then these are the types of projects that will be prioritised. 
As with so many aspects of Syria’s future, the nature of the economic model that results from this transition will depend on a clash between conflicting interests. Figures from the international political and economic elite want Syria opened up, Lebanon style, where a laissez-faire economy allows for a class of super-wealthy investors to extract massive profits from tourism, construction and finance, while the rest of the country stagnates. 
The actions taken by workers in Suwayda and Daraa are especially important because they point to the only force that has the power to fight for a different kind of future. There are other, smaller, initiatives taking place, and grassroots organising is happening among workers and professionals across the country. 
But it would be wrong to expect an explosion of unionisation and class struggle overnight. Over a coffee in a Lebanese cafe, Syrian socialist Joseph Daher suggested that the location of these actions is no accident: “Daraa and Suwayda have experience in organising themselves, they have a culture of this kind of politics now”. This was confirmed when I discovered that the strike in Suwayda was organised through the same WhatsApp community that has organised the region’s Movement for Freedom and Change since 2023. 
“There have also been protests in Idlib against HTS’s decision [now rescinded] to raise tariffs on the import of essential goods”, Daher continued. “All of these places were liberated by the revolution some time ago; they are used to mobilising. It’s not quite the same in Damascus and Aleppo.” The process of developing trade union and left-wing organisations will thus take time and effort.
Yet, after so many years of misery, many young Syrians can’t bear the thought of more years of struggle and poverty. Many exiles, particularly the younger ones and those who made it to Europe, are only returning for short visits to see their loved ones. And many of those who stayed in Syria but now have the capacity to leave are planning to do so, especially those with university qualifications. 
“I’m delighted that our country is finally free, but who knows how long it will take for things to actually get better”, revealed one young doctor in Damascus. “It’s impossible to build a secure life here, and I feel like I’m starting to get old.”

Can the Syrian people resist a new capitalist regime?

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship. All his articles can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a>
section.
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“Each and every family has paid a price for our freedom”, explains a middle-aged man, his dark eyes betraying suppressed despair. “Some lost their homes, some lost years of their lives, and others lost their children, whether as exiles or martyrs.” Preferring to remain nameless out of fear of retribution, he spent seven years in jail for the crime of living in the Syrian town of Daraa, whose revolutionary spirit was a perpetual thorn in the side of the regime. He returned to his home, a shack in a refugee camp for Syrians displaced during the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, to find his neighbourhood destroyed. Yet another Syrian town turned to rubble. 
Daraa was one of the birthplaces of the popular revolution against Assad, when a group of around twenty teenagers were arrested and tortured for anti-government graffiti. The local backlash to their abuse was the spark that inspired a heroic rebellion that lasted more than a decade. “We didn’t understand the full significance of what we were doing at the time”, explains Mouawiya, one of the teenagers <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3162211/one-daraa-children-who-sparked-syria-revolt-recounts-asharq-al-awsat-his">involved in the action</a>. “We were still just kids.” 
But his experience of being tortured in Assad’s prisons taught him all he needed to know about the dictatorship’s brutality. It instilled in him a lifelong commitment to struggle for justice. “They tortured us so badly, using electric shocks, pulling off our fingernails ... it was hard.” Another local explains that he was hung for two weeks by his wrists and allowed only one ten-minute break each day for a sip of water. The jailors hoped to turn the activists into informers, and to find out “who was funding us”, Mouawiya explains. “But none of it had any impact. When they released me, I spent the next five or six months in peaceful protests that kept getting attacked, first with batons and then with bullets and bombs.” 
This was the fate of the revolutionary movement across Syria at the time. In Egypt and Tunisia, the regimes abandoned their figureheads in order to preserve the core of the ruling edifice, whose military, economic and political power lay untouched. They calculated that such a move would best preserve their power in the long run. The brutal suppression of protesters in Bahrain and Syria proved to be an alternative option. In both cases, the dictatorship was too narrowly based, and in the Syrian example, too tied to the personality and family of the leader, to attempt the Egyptian method. “So after a while, we formed the Free Syrian Army to fight back.”
Mouawiya explains that the Free Syrian Army was a fairly loose outfit, neighbours arming themselves to defend their communities against an unimaginably violent state. “To begin with, it was mostly small groups of young guys who knew each other, say 20-50 people”, he says. “They would have a leader that would work with other similar groups in the broader district. Eventually we developed a unified command.” That process of organisation took time, and according to Mouawiya, never went beyond the level of Daraa province. Despite its name, the FSA was never a national army, with coordinated battle plans and resources. Rather, it was, depending on the area, a mix of former soldiers that had defected to the revolution and local citizens that had armed themselves to defend their families. 
Like in other parts of Syria, the revolution was especially strong in the poorer, working-class areas of Daraa, whose people had suffered the worst impacts of the crony capitalist dictatorship. It is not a touristy area, nor one blessed by natural beauty or resources. Rather, generation after generation has earned a living tilling the stony soil, the bottom strata of workers living in tents on the land where they work. The city’s main roads are dusty and dilapidated, even by Syrian standards. Its one hotel manifests the absolute disconnect of the regime from its people. Clearly designed for official visits, the ground floor is opulent in a classical Arabian style, built from marble, gold and glass. Never mind the slums outside. 
With extraordinary difficulty and bravery, the FSA in Daraa liberated large swathes of the governorate for substantial periods of time, including many of the suburbs and small agricultural towns. By 2024, the only part they didn’t control was the heart of Daraa’s capital city, which remained under heavy military occupation. 
Though the people of Daraa are rightfully proud of their heroic resistance, it has left their region scarred beyond recognition. Arriving from Suwayda was like entering another country. Every single home on the freeway is marked by the conflict, and entire suburbs lie in rubble. My driver takes an unscheduled detour to show me what the regime did. We pass through the suburb of Al Mansheyah, which lies on top of a little hill, and it’s like being back in Yarmouk or Harasta. Every other house has been liquidated; kids play soccer in the debris.
All this devastation is the product of thirteen years of assault from the land and sky. Some parts of Daraa were fought over multiple times. Others were mostly free but subjected to endless bombing from above. Mouawiya’s brother Mohammad shows me the three-metre hole in his roof where a barrel bomb hit, destroying an entire level of his apartment building as well as a bedroom below. Sealing off the damaged areas is the best they can do for now. They can’t even afford to eat properly each day, let alone rebuild. 
The Russian air force also bears much responsibility for the damage, launching wave after wave of bombing raids from its Hmeimim airbase. One boy, around 11 years old, tells me that they used to get warning calls from friends in Damascus, giving them a few precious minutes to seek shelter before the bombs began falling. Many people fled the area, seeking refuge in Jordan or Lebanon, while some fighters were sent to Idlib in the north as part of various truces. But many others had no option but to stay. One man says that he spent months living in the nearby telephone interchange without sanitation, water or electricity.
Faysal, a teacher and member of a grassroots committee for the provision of social services, explains that the district had 40 schools to begin with, but by 2018, only four were still standing. The rebels have built another sixteen since then, he says proudly. Families here clearly value education highly, their children’s futures a big concern even amidst the horror of war: “We didn’t want the kids to miss one day of school, and they didn’t”, beams Hanaan, another local teacher. But she admits that the war badly affected the younger generation. “They’re mentally unwell, they recoil from loud noises”, she says, ruffling the hair of a nearby boy.
There are other initiatives to try to improve amenities in the area. Nagham, a local activist I met in Damascus two weeks ago, is leading a campaign to replant trees that had been chopped down for heating fuel during the war. “I see the re-greening of Daraa as serving two purposes”, she says. “First, it’s about bringing natural beauty back to Daraa. Second, I see it as a way of holding on to the souls and memories of the revolution’s martyrs.”
The area’s many mosques are also slowly being rebuilt after the regime destroyed almost all of them. In this fairly religious and largely Sunni town, such spaces are a vital centre of social life as much as they are a place for prayer. It is moving to see thousands of these impoverished people gathering for Friday prayers in the partial ruins of a mosque, having survived, both physically and spiritually, the systematic terror of the past 54 years. 
Mouawiya does not romanticise the armed phase of the rebellion, saying that “things started getting messy when money and guns started coming in from the outside”. Some hustlers and crooks got involved, some of them making a lot of money reselling guns meant for the resistance. Mouawiya is visibly angry at this, insisting that it was possible to remain clean if one was fighting for the right reasons. It is inspiring to see this man hold on to principle in a situation of social and economic breakdown, when the regime has made all normal life impossible.
In recent times, some of the FSA brigades in Daraa have begun affiliating to HTS. They were attracted by its superior funding and organisation, but also by what they saw as its success in governing Idlib province. “Things are great there, almost like Europe”, claims an armed guard patrolling the streets. He moved to Idlib just a few months ago after his father was appointed to a leading position within HTS. They returned to Daraa triumphantly, part of HTS’s southward march through Hama, Homs and Damascus. “We’re in HTS, but all the fighters here are local guys”, he emphasises. His fellow militiaman never went to Idlib but has joined HTS for similar reasons. He was first politicised by being shot in the back at the age of nine for playing on his front porch during a government-imposed curfew.
There are plenty of fighters that have not joined HTS. Mouawiya insists that he remains independent and that, in any case, HTS won’t exist for much longer. “It’s finished. All the groups will all be united into the Syrian army. And then there will be elections. There has to be.”
Overall, the dominant impression from Daraa is a feeling of somewhat resigned relief, a great distance from the elation and bustle of central Damascus. People are hopeful, but the suffering of previous years is inescapable, bruising, inscribed both in their physical environment and their collective psyche.
This is partly due to the terrible economic conditions that plague Daraa, and much of Syria. Mouawiya and his family continue to live in grinding poverty, as do most people he knows. Work is hard to find and doesn’t pay much. Freedom hasn’t yet increased anyone’s capacity to buy food, or diesel for heating. Nor has it dealt with the extreme electricity shortages, which mean most people get no more than a couple of hours a day. Several people also rage about the lack of viable homes in the area. “You’re lucky to find a single enclosed room for your whole family”, one says.
If a viable and better Syria is to be built from the ashes of the Assad dynasty, it will need to meet these essential needs—in Daraa and across the rest of the country.

In Daraa, heroes of the revolution plan their future amid the ruins

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship. This is the sixth in his series of reports, the complete list of which can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a>
section.
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“We grew up with [socialist musicians] Marcel Khalifi, Julia Butros, Shaikh Imam ... many of us were communists when we were younger, back before they joined the regime”, Safaa says. We’re in an apartment in the southern city of Suwayda, where three women—Safaa, Oussayma and Omayma—explain the history of the area’s revolutionary resistance to former dictator Bashar al-Assad. 
“The hirak, the movement for freedom and change, started in August of 2023. It started because prices were going up so high; inflation was just making everything unbearably expensive”, Oussayma explains. At the same time, the government decided to cut state subsidies on essential goods like petrol and bread. “These were the issues that mobilised people: we wanted to eat, have water and electricity, to live a decent life. At one point, the state-subsidised bread amounted to less than a full loaf. That’s why it was initially called the bread revolution. 
“A group of youth, very small to begin with, went down to Karama Square to protest in August 2023”, she continues. “They came back every single day after that for one year and four months. Of course, not everyone could be there every day, so Fridays became the focus for large actions. Once the fear was gone, people just went for it.”
They’ve been doing it ever since—a year and four months of daily and weekly actions. The protests grew quickly, peaking at around 8,000 people. Most of the initiators were veterans of the 2011 revolution and had been active in the repeated waves of protests in Suwayda in the intervening years. To begin with, the movement focused on renewing the subsidies and lowering the cost of goods, that is, for reforms. But quickly, their ambitions grew, and they started demanding the fall of the regime. 
“People endured the biting cold, the snow, the heat of summer—it didn’t matter, we were there”, Omayma says. Through their placards and chants, protesters sought to highlight grievances and issues from across Syria, but also international events such as Israel’s genocide in Palestine. Inevitably, there were debates. 
“A section of people stopped coming when we raised the slogan of bringing down the regime”, Safaa explains. “They said, ‘We were here about the price of bread’. What they were really worried about was that the regime would do to Suwayda what it did to the rest of the country.”
This situation was worsened by undercover officers who were sent in to cause trouble and division wherever possible. “They used to start fights over everything, things as simple as what songs we would play during the protests. As numbers got smaller, they kept saying that we were defeated, that we should stop”, Oussayma says. “At times, when the actions were smaller, they would just try to snatch people off the street.”
“Also, you have to understand that women were the big majority of the movement here”, she continues. “The reason was that there had been a collective decision made in 2016 that no man from Suwayda would agree to serve in the Syrian army, to kill their brothers, their people, fellow Syrians. If the army was fighting Israel, we would happily have served.” 
Many men left the country to avoid this fate, often by paying Hezbollah a bribe to take them over the mountains to Lebanon, from which they could go elsewhere. The women find humour in a situation where the party responsible for propping up Assad through murderous repression would simultaneously profit from his victims. Those who couldn’t afford to get out were often trapped in their local towns and villages, unable to travel for fear of being snatched at government checkpoints.
Women were therefore vital to maintaining the street mobilisations organised by the umbrella group, Movement for Freedom and Change. The regime’s supporters and security services began a terrible campaign of slander and harassment of activists online, particularly targeting women. They hoped that by posting unflattering photos and suggesting that they were behaving inappropriately, their partners or family members would discipline them into silence. 
Safaa, Oussayma and Omayma are furiously speaking over one another at this stage, conveying their disgust. But they admit that it did have an impact. “Even if your family was supportive, people knew what was happening in Sednaya and other prisons, so once you became a focus for the security… well, it was seriously scary”, Omayma says.
Were there any difficulties regarding women’s involvement from within the movement itself? “No way, our community here isn’t like some other places. We’ve been involved from the start”, Safaa says. “Actually, the guys were encouraging us to come out, they were quite open-minded.” 
Having said that, it was mostly a small group of men from the 2011 era calling the shots to begin with. But the movement gradually became more collective and inclusive. “We didn’t have separate women’s meetings; we were encouraged to take part as equals in decision-making, as spokespeople, in everything”, Oussayma says. “Some meetings were called off entirely if there weren’t enough women present. But of course, it wasn’t all easy—there were sometimes big debates. Democracy can be hard in this country. But I used to say that even if we didn’t overthrow the government, the movement taught us a lot about politics and how the world really is.” 
How is it that they weren’t just slaughtered by the regime, like so many others around the country? The activists say that they had taken full advantage of a contradiction within the regime’s propaganda, which claimed to defend minorities against violent extremism (that is, against the Sunni majority). This made it harder for the army to drown Suwayda in blood. This constraint gave the people here precious space to organise, but it was far from easy. Activists were still being killed and kidnapped—the kaleidoscopic range of security forces in Syria continued to operate underground. But through their courageous defiance, activists in Suwayda eventually won a degree of political freedom unheard of in other regime-controlled areas. 
“We have not been under the direct control of the regime for something like ten years”, Safaa confirms. “That’s why, when the movement began, [the regime] counted to one million before dealing with us militarily.” The government had made an effort to reestablish itself in 2018, after ISIS occupied some eastern villages and towns and committed massacres across the region. “Actually, the regime brought ISIS here”, Safaa says. “But the people here rose up and we crushed them, drove them out ourselves on the very first day.”
This significance of the city’s independent military capacity is emphasised more by others in Suwayda, especially Alaa, a leading figure in one of the town’s largest militias, Liwaa al Jabal, or the Mountain Brigades. Joining us in the flat, he explains Suwayda’s relative autonomy as being a product of their fighting strength.
“My militia alone had 4-5,000 people under arms, and there were many others”, he says. “Most of the time, we didn’t directly clash with the regime. But if they tried anything, for instance, if they snatched one of our people in Damascus or from a protest, we fought back. We would kidnap their soldiers and exchange them or threaten their commanding officer in the region. Things were mostly resolved that way.” 
Walking and driving around Suwayda, it is obvious that the city and surrounding districts have not suffered the same devastating destruction seen in other parts of Syria. There are no buildings destroyed by missiles or bombs, no bullet-ridden homes. There are also fancier buildings and shops, more large construction projects underway, and fewer visible signs of poverty. 
“Almost every family in Suwayda has some people outside the country, sending money back”, Ra’fat, my driver, later explains. “As well, there’s a higher proportion of people who’ve studied at university, in higher paying jobs.” Alaa makes a similar point, saying that most of the militia was made up of educated people. It’s impossible to confirm many details as there is little data on Syria’s population (though the transitional authorities are planning a census soon). But this relatively clean and functioning city of 500,000 is a taste of what Syria could have been had the Assad family not clung to power with such maniacal tenacity.
Alaa is quietly confident about the future. This week, his militia announced their intent to merge with the other main local militia, the Men of Dignity (Dignity Square being the location of the many protests held in Suwayda’s capital city). In a joint press conference, both declared their willingness to join a future Syrian army. “We will negotiate with [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)] as equals”, Alaa insists. Their unified command now controls 10-12,000 fighters. 
Their statement was endorsed by the most prominent sheikh in the area, who has long positioned himself as an advocate of the movement. (“Though he has always had his own ambitions that don’t exactly match ours”, warns one of the women). Importantly, he emphasised that Suwayda must have a role in the shaping of the new Syria, not simply be told of the outcome. 
People here remain fiercely committed to their independence, which they see as the only guarantee of their freedom and rights under the new regime. Alaa explains that HTS sent 35 cars filled with soldiers on New Year’s Eve, hoping to occupy the area by catching the local fighters by surprise. “We turned them around on the highway and told them that if they entered, they would be slaughtered. And that was that.” As a result, along with Kurdish-controlled areas in the north-east, Suwayda is the only governorate in Syria without an armed HTS presence. There is, however, an HTS envoy, Mustafa al-Bakkour, who is in practice functioning as the area’s governor, which nobody seems to mind. 
There is a trend, represented in the Liwaa Party (unaffiliated with the militia), that advocate the secession of Suwayda from Syria. They have an informal alliance with the right wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish forces controlling north-eastern Syria, and are similarly open to collaboration with the West and Israel to achieve this goal. But I’m told that most people in Suwayda reject this approach, and that the movement voted not to allow their slogans in the square. “We are Syrians; we do not want to be separate”, Safaa says. The others agree. 
There is some disagreement about how to proceed with the transition. Alaa expresses some lingering bitterness about those who served in the old regime: “Honestly, I feel we can’t just move on—we need them to know that we know who they are, to feel the shame”. Safaa disagrees: “We need justice, but it needs to be restorative justice. We need to rebuild a sense of community, to forgive each other for the crimes of the past”. Ra’fat concurs: “We should hold senior figures accountable, but most of them have left the country. The average soldier had no choice: they were conscripted, there was a gun to their head. We need to start with a blank page”.
The women speak about HTS with a familiar mix of hope and trepidation. “Things have been pretty reasonable so far—Jolani is acting carefully. His ministers have said and done wrong things, but when there’s been a popular uproar then Jolani walks it back”, Oussayma says. (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is the nom de guerre of HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has become the country’s de facto leader.) 
Safaa offers a slightly different perspective. “We lived many years under this terrible regime, with so much fear and anxiety. It hasn’t just all gone away overnight”, she says. “We don’t even really know what freedom will look like. Also, in this area, most of us are Druze ... We are very worried that the new government will adopt a strict interpretation of Islam; their ideas are very conservative.” 
Alaa is even more sceptical: “The man was al-Qaeda, and politically, he’s still al-Qaeda. His ideas don’t fit with the people here; we want a progressive, secular state”. These fears are far from baseless. Where HTS and its predecessors governed the northern city of Idlib, Christian and Druze villagers were subjected to serious sectarian violence and had their lands and homes stolen. Women were forced to wear the hijab, and conservative social norms were policed strictly. While Jolani has recently made an effort to undo some of the worst excesses, if only to soothe domestic and international opinion, issues remain, and these crimes have not been forgotten. 
Yet, once again, all insist on differentiating between HTS, with its strict interpretation of Sharia law, and the Muslim community as a whole. “Suwayda has received so many refugees from parts of the country that the regime was attacking. We were happy to welcome them; we don’t have any problems with anyone living here”, Safaa says. “But [HTS] have been trapped in Idlib for so long, they don’t know what Syria is like, what Damascus, Suwayda, Tartous are like.” 
Oussayma cuts in: “There’s no way that [HTS] is going to be able to run the whole of Syria like Idlib. If they try, we’ll rise up again. We defeated the old regime, we have our own militias, we can do anything now”.

‘We can do anything now’: how activists in this Syrian city plan to shape the country’s future

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship. This is the fifth in his series of reports, the complete list of which can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a>
section.
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As I climb out of the microbus and take my first steps in Yarmouk refugee camp, in the south of Damascus, I spot two young boys slowly digging through a pile of garbage and rubble. I ask if I can take their photo, part of documenting what Assad did to this area and its people. They look at me suspiciously, layers of filth clinging to their faces and clothes. “No, go photograph someone else”, one of them says. They look tired, defeated, possibly embarrassed. I sense their eyes on me as I walk away, wondering what my deal is. Eventually, they return to their scavenging. They’re no more than 10 years old. 
According to UN records, Yarmouk was home to around 160,000 people before 2011, overwhelmingly Palestinians. My driver, Ahmad, boasts that it was once one of the most economically vibrant parts of Damascus, with shopping districts, industrial sectors and more. He takes me to visit Abu Saeed Aidi, an old man born in 1945 in the now obliterated Palestinian village of Lubya. He’s lived in the camp for decades and tells a similar story of Yarmouk once being a thriving centre of Palestinian life. His eyes shine with pride when he describes how the camp was designed by a Palestinian engineer from Jerusalem using the most modern ideas available at the time, how it had a democratic structure different from the rest of Damascus, and how generous donations from abroad meant it had the best infrastructure of any suburb. 
There’s nothing left of that now. 
Ahmad drives for over half an hour, winding through the narrow, desolate streets. I try to film, but it’s hopeless. The reality of such devastation can’t be captured with images alone. Row after row, block after block after block of destroyed homes. An old UN school bombed to smithereens. The shell of not one but two enormous mosques, meeting places and cultural centres for a once thriving community. A small garden, its healthy crop of string beans merely highlights the devastation surrounding it. An old playground, a rusty swing, a fading children’s painting of a happy family, one of the kids waving the regime flag. 
Saeed al-Shneeni is keen to talk as soon as he gets in the car. “You need to record this”, he says confidently. He’s a long-term camp resident, and he has stories to tell about every building we pass. “That’s the checkpoint where they used to randomly kidnap people”, he says as we pass a small concrete pillbox on a narrow street. “That’s the line of demarcation, where every building was demolished to give the government a clearer shot into the camp. Then, they stole the steel from the rubble to sell on the black market. Criminals in every way, these people.”
He tells a tale of the five-year siege of Yarmouk, which the regime imposed between 2013 and 2018. Its effects were so brutal, so total, that an Amnesty International report published in 2014 found that 128 people starved to death that year alone. This was collective punishment for the crime of supporting the Syrian revolution. 
Saeed says that a wealthy Palestinian exile eventually bribed the regime to allow an aid delivery. Authorities took the cash but opened fire on those who lined up for food. It became known as the Rijeh square massacre. “It was just like what the Israelis did in Gaza last year”, he says. Seven more people died in that incident, killed while lining up for bread to feed their loved ones.
Yarmouk had also been home to a vibrant Palestinian civil society. “There were more than fourteen [political] factions”, says Ahmad’s nephew, Mohammed, who joins us for lunch. “Each faction had their own organising committees and armed wings ... but that’s all finished now.”
The regime kept them on a very short leash. In fact, they had a special office within the internal security department tasked with abducting, torturing and killing Palestinian organisers who stepped out of line. Referred to as the “Palestine branch”, it attracted some of the most brutal and sadistic people within the Syrian state. They were responsible for responding to the revolutionary uprising that found a strong echo in Yarmouk and the surrounding neighbourhoods.
By the time Assad’s forces retook Yarmouk in 2018, the camp was a wreck, and only a few hundred people remained. The combination of famine and endless bombardment had made the area unliveable, forcing over 100,000 Palestinians into yet another exile. To make matters worse, ISIS and Nusra had overrun the camp a few years earlier. These reactionaries drove out the remaining rebels and spent the next three years terrorising any citizens that remained. 
Undeterred by the scarcity of living beings to harass, the soldiers were ordered to abuse the dead instead. Ahmad takes me to Yarmouk cemetery, where the gravestones have been smashed. “They gave us no peace, even in death”, he says. 
It’s not until we’ve sat down for lunch in Ahmad’s home that Saeed talks about how the arbitrary violence of the Syrian state forever changed his own life.
“At the time, we were still living in our flat on the fourth storey of a building near here”, he says. “But the bombing was so constant that my wife and I had decided to sleep in separate rooms, so that if one of us died, the other could keep looking after the kids.” 
They were eventually forced to move to their parents’ house after a bomb landed on their next-door neighbour’s apartment. A few weeks later, their 16-year-old son, Mahmoud, went missing. “It was strange at the time—nobody was staying outside after dark due to all the fighting. I was up all night worried, and when he didn’t return, I spent the next week looking for him. I looked everywhere, asking anyone if they had seen him.”
After trying everything else, Saeed went to the morgue. “The worker there showed me body after body ... At one point, I thought I had found him, but it turned out to be someone else’s child. I was relieved, but still very stressed.” The mortician told him to try the internal security office, where a database was kept of dead bodies “found” locally. 
Saeed’s eyes glaze over; retelling the story has sent him back in time. “When I got to the relevant room in the security building, [there was] a man sitting behind a computer, with an officer on either side. They were showing him pictures of dead faces, sixteen to a page.” Saeed stood behind them and watched them scrolling through endless pictures. He describes feeling torn between wanting to find his son and yet wanting to cling to the hope that he was alive. Soon, his face showed up. “I yelled, ‘That’s my son!’ They hadn’t even noticed I was there until then.” Saeed was then shown eight pictures of Mahmoud’s body. He’d been shot in the head at close range. That’s all Saeed ever learned about the loss of his precious child.
But this story isn’t finished.
In 2014, two years after Mahmoud’s execution, Saeed’s son Ousama was a month away from graduating high school, having specialised in administration and law. Saeed’s family had moved to yet another apartment—“more space for the kids”, he explains. One day, a government employee came to their house and asked them to go to the mayor’s office to register their new addresses with the local administration. On arrival, both Saeed and Ousama were arrested and thrown into a van. After a few minutes, Saeed was let out and dropped off on the street without charge or explanation. He was never to see his son again. 
For years later, members of the internal security came to his house, promising to get information about his son in exchange for money. “I must have paid out over $5,000”, he says. This was a common practice, Ahmad interjects—a way of extorting cash from desperate people. “I knew they were manipulating me, but I would have done anything to hear something about my boy”, Saeed says. He never got anything in return for these transactions but doesn’t regret trying.
Two weeks ago, he received a message from his daughter. Her friends had sent her a photo of an official document from 2015. It was a photo of a list of names of dead bodies found in the region surrounding Yarmouk. It included his son, described only as “Palestinian” and listed as number sixteen. 
Because Ousama was never officially declared dead, Saeed’s last surviving son Abdullah was almost forced to serve in the same Syrian army that had killed his brothers. The prospect nearly drove Saeed insane. It took another round of bribery—worth another couple of thousand that he didn’t have—to convince the local bureaucracy to sign off on his status as an only child. Today, he’s in Germany, building a new life for himself.
In tears, I find myself apologising to Saeed for his suffering, on behalf of an indifferent world. He shrugs, tells me not to worry. He leaves shortly after with the look of a man who has completed a difficult but necessary task. It seems that sharing this traumatic incident with the world, even just some nobody from Australia, is for Saeed an act of resistance and love. 
Ahmad subsequently tells me that Saeed suffered enormously during the intervening years, the stress and sadness leading to a range of health issues. “The regime took his sons, but they also took the best years of his life.”
By the end, the Assad regime’s sole claim to legitimacy was its supposed support for the resistance to Israel. Of course, those with the most basic knowledge of Syria’s history know about the regime’s treason during Black September, its defence of the far-right, pro-Israeli forces in Lebanon’s civil war, its role in driving Yasser Arafat and the PLO out of Lebanon not once but twice, and how it defended Israel’s borders better than any other Arab state in the region. 
But regardless of this history, what the regime did to the Yarmouk refugee camp, to people like Saeed, should stand on its own as an unforgivable crime. Indeed, Assad’s thugs killed more Palestinians in Yarmouk than Israel did in any one of its wars prior to 7 October. 
As we’re digesting our dinner, Ahmad gets a call from his son in Germany. He announces that it looks like the government might be about to revoke the asylum status of many of the nearly 1 million Syrian refugees in the country. 
Mohammed grimaces. Just minutes earlier, he had explained that he planned to seek asylum in Germany alongside his wife and 10-month-old baby. This news must have broken his heart, but he hides it behind a bitter smile: “The Arab world doesn’t want us, and the West doesn’t want us. They should just send me to Gaza so I can die fighting for my country”, he says.

Yarmouk: Assad’s obliteration of a Palestinian refugee camp

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship. This is the fourth in his series of reports, the complete list of which can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a>
section.
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“Field executions and random killings [have become] a daily occurrence. Among the most affected areas, the provinces of Hama and Homs were at the forefront of these crimes ... followed by the Syrian coast, particularly in Latakia and Tartous.” These chilling lines are taken from a bulletin by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights released on 3 January. 
It’s a stark reminder that the situation in Damascus, where stability reigns and the right to protest and gather peacefully is fairly unchallenged, is not the experience of all Syrians at this time.
Footage and reports from a four-day siege of the town of Khirbet Al-Ma’azzah went viral in the days before Christmas. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) had subjected its people to daily searches, harassment and interrogations. It was eventually lifted, but only after an entirely apolitical employee of the state electricity company was found shot dead in his house. 
Meanwhile, in Homs, residents have been subjected to door-to-door searches by armed HTS militants. The most terrifying rumours about what was going on quickly spread, some of which were confirmed in a definitive statement released by the Homs Civil Peace group. In careful and nuanced language, they accepted the principle of the operation, which is to arrest and punish senior figures from the Assad regime, but condemned its heavy-handed approach. 
They described incidents of arbitrary destruction of property, physical and verbal assaults of civilians, forcing people to bark like dogs, harassment of some women found not wearing the hijab, arrests conducted without explanation or chance for appeal, and the deployment of tanks in civilian areas. 
Stories of these outrages spread throughout Syria primarily via Facebook, which I’ve noticed is not hobbled by the same censorship that has driven English-speaking activists to other platforms. Posts written in Arabic routinely receive hundreds if not thousands of reactions, followed by furious debate in the comment section. 
At times, these debates can fall into sectarian patterns and discourses. Syria has vast regional variations in economic conditions, ethnic and religious compositions, languages and accents. The old regime expertly pitted groups against each other to expand its profits and power. 
For instance, it is widely understood, both externally and within Syria itself, that the Assad dynasty was a sectarian Alawi operation. There is an element of truth to that, as many key posts in the state and public institutions were given to fellow members of the Assad family and those from its community. This then tended to cascade down in the form of nepotistic hiring practices and so on, which in turn led to hostility from other communities towards the Alawi.
While the top leaders of the transitional government have been careful to avoid saying anything explicitly bigoted, their cadres and supporters have been less restrained. Calls to “cleanse” Syria of supporters of the former regime can sometimes be code for wider attacks on the Alawi community. 
But Nour, a young comrade from the Syrian Revolutionary Left Current (RLC), has a different perspective: “People talk as if the Assad regime was defined by its sectarianism, but that’s wrong; its only religious commitment was to wealth”. This is an important point. Assad’s most consistent supporters were the largely Sunni bourgeoisie of Damascus. There are huge economic, social and political divisions within the Alawi community, as with all others. A number of courageous efforts were made to organise resistance to the regime by Alawis themselves, and the left is filled with figures from that community who rejected the regime for the same reasons as everyone else. 
She made these comments at a public meeting of RLC, in the relatively clean-cut Damascus suburb of Sahnaya. It was a young and dynamic crowd, with women a slight majority of the 35 people present. Nour kicked off proceedings, explaining that it was the first public meeting the group had held since the fall of the regime. The meeting was held in the back room of a house that had been used for illegal meetings through the years of dictatorship. 
British socialist and Middle East expert Anne Alexander addressed the audience on lessons from the Arab Spring, her face projected onto a cardboard screen. 
Later, I attended a meeting organised by the Nissan Women’s Group in the Jaramana Social Forum, previously the local HQ of the ruling Syrian Ba’ath Party. I’m told that Jaramana itself is an interesting part of Damascus, with a strong alternative subculture and a more liberal attitude to relationships and women’s rights. On this night, about 100 people, much older and with more men than the earlier meeting, showed up for what turned out to be fairly technical talks on macroeconomic policy in Syria. 
It was clear, however, that the attendees at both events were far more interested in discussing concrete perspectives and proposals than historical and theoretical issues. Where the talks had a somewhat abstract flavour, especially in Jaramana, audience members wanted to know how to take forward the fight for social and economic justice in Syria today. 
Both meetings saw repeated complaints that there had been no shift in the approach to decision-making from the old regime. “We can sit here and talk about what we would like, but they’re not listening to us”, one man complained in Jaramana. “How do we turn that around?” One young radical responded by arguing forcefully, if optimistically, for a general strike: “It’s the only way to force them to listen”. 
In Sahnaya, attendees expressed similar concerns: “Do [HTS] really need 3-4 years to write a constitution, or is that just a tactic to stall until they have all the power?”, someone asked. Another pointed to the elephant in the room: “How do we mobilise to defend our rights without provoking another civil war?” No easy answers. 
Alexander stressed the need to build and strengthen independent unions that can use their power at the point of production to discipline bourgeois forces like HTS. Such a project is well beyond the capacities of this small group of young revolutionaries at this stage but it helped point the way forward.
Lines are quickly being drawn between supporters and opponents of the new government. For now, its critics are mostly on the back foot, responding to specific incidents and policies rather than setting the agenda. They’re racing to establish institutions and spaces that can allow them to think, organise and resist collectively. 
On the other side, HTS are taking full advantage of their status as the only nationally organised force in Syria. Governing in Idlib gave them time and space to consolidate their political and military machine, assisted by extensive foreign donations. Their leaders are intelligent and battle-tested and are learning to enjoy being at the helm of the Syrian state while being wooed by global capital. 
To justify their unilateral assumption of power, HTS use the slogan, “Those that did the liberating get to do the decision-making”. It would be a lie to say this argument, as anti-democratic as it is, has no purchase among the broader Syrian public. But HTS’s reactionary program—and the brutal, anti-revolutionary actions of many of its leaders during the civil war and its reign in Idlib—mean that many remain wary. 
For now, the majority of Syrians are watching and waiting to see what comes next, willing to give the new government a chance. But that could change at any moment, triggered by an overreach or some other crisis. The transition from a 54-year dictatorship will take months, if not years, to unfold, and there will be many shifts in momentum and the balance of forces. 
As we leave the meeting in Jaramana, my companion, an experienced journalist who has thrown herself into democratic organising, seems a bit down. She asks me what I think will happen to Syria. I tell her I have no idea, but that’s a positive in and of itself. Under Assad, it was guaranteed misery from here to eternity.

In Damascus, leftists continue to organise

Red Flag’s Omar Hassan, a longstanding supporter of the 
Syrian revolution and a Palestine solidarity activist, is in Syria to 
report on the situation after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship.
 This is the third in his series of reports, the complete list of which can be found in our <a href="https://redflag.org.au/category/syria-after-assad">Syria After Assad</a>
section.
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“This revolution is just getting started”, says Fadi, a man in his late 50s, standing on the steps of the Syrian Ministry of Education. “We have to keep pushing forward. It’s not over until everyone has their rights cemented”. I’m with about 50 Syrians, who are protesting against a move by the new government, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to shift the school curriculum towards a sectarian and conservative Islamist worldview. 
Everyone agrees that the pro-Assad propaganda that saturates the textbooks needs to be removed. But the proposed reforms go further: eliminating lessons on evolution and the Big Bang theory, abolishing all negative references to the Ottoman Empire, and removing all mention of the various polytheistic communities in Syria’s history. The changes would also teach students in primary school that Christians and Jews are “those who have lost their way” from Islam. 
The decree was immediately rejected loudly by many, many Syrians. So much so that the government was forced to walk back the changes even before the demonstration today, which meant it was fairly small. But it was an important gathering nonetheless. For one thing, there were lots of media present, giving left-wing activists a rare opportunity to make their voices heard to the Syrian people about their vision of an inclusive and just society for all. 
More important, however, was the chance for progressive activists to meet each other and share ideas and plans for the future. There were two types of people present. Many were veterans of the underground, aged 60 or more, some having served lengthy jail sentences for their brave efforts. 
“I was an oppositionist against the dad [Hafez al-Assad], I was an oppositionist against the son [Bashar], and I’m an oppositionist today”, says a charismatic older man, who eventually outs himself as a member of the Communist Labor Party. I’m introduced to Haseeba Abdulrahman, an independent socialist and feminist writer, who concurs: “We haven’t won anything yet, we need a stronger left, serious political parties to cement our gains and push for more”.
There was a good number of younger radicals who had been active in the early days of the revolution in 2011, and had been waiting desperately for a chance to take to the streets once again. “We were there from the start, and even in the last years there’s been some organising happening underground”, says Dima, a speech pathologist in Damascus. 
I ask them what they think of those who say to be patient, to give the new government time. Tarek, a computer engineer, interjects forcefully: “How can we give them more time? They sat down for two hours this week and produced this terrible reform of the education system. If we leave them alone, what damage will they do tomorrow?! The first responsibility of a citizen is to hold their government to account”. 
Dima jumps back in: “We’re not seeing different methods of operating from the last regime; they change the policy and we’re just expected to just accept it. Where’s the participation, where’s the democratic Syria we’ve been promised?”
These guys are impressive, but they’re in their 30s and early 40s. When I ask about the lack of representation from students and youth, it was put to me that their generation were too young to have experienced the revolutionary era, and so are less politically engaged. Presumably, the winter holidays don’t help either.
In any case, it’s been less than a month since Assad fell, and people are still finding their feet. Still, there’s been an explosion of political meetings and actions. At the same time as the education protest, a group of former prisoners was rallying to demand justice for those who tortured them in prison. Every day, there are meetings and actions organised by socialists, feminists, liberal NGOs, artists, the families of those who were disappeared in Assad’s prison system, and more. 
It’s not all fun and games. At times, the efforts of this emerging left have been widely criticised and condemned. Partly, this can be due to sincere misunderstandings about their goals because many associate the concepts of secularism and socialism with the old regime. But there’s something more cynical at play too—a serious effort by HTS supporters to discredit any opposition as feloul (“remnants” of the old regime). Dima laughs when I point that out: “No way, it’s the exact opposite. People I know who were total sucks for Assad are now some of the biggest supporters of HTS”. 
Halla, a member of Syria’s Revolutionary Left Current (RLC), made a related point when we met for coffee yesterday. “They call us the feloul, but actually, HTS has incorporated a number of figures from the old regime.” This is particularly the case when it comes to economic policy: the new governor of the central bank was the deputy under Assad. 
Other leading figures from Assad’s economic team, known for privatising everything and cutting as many subsidies as possible, are being tapped to play important roles. HTS is doing this to signal its commitment to playing by the rules of the capitalist system. Halla also explains how, across the country, a number of former regime figures and bureaucrats have flipped their loyalties to HTS, including the top leadership of many trade and student unions. 
It’s early days, but some have already begun organising against the new power. Firefighters in Damascus struck after being sacked and replaced with people from Idlib, winning a promise to be re-employed later. The lawyers’ union has come under attack after Damascene lawyers were indefinitely barred from working, and there’s now talk of establishing an independent union. The reopening of schools and universities in a few weeks could also create new possibilities for resistance. 
At the end of the education rally, someone makes an announcement about an organising meeting scheduled for later that day, the second meeting of a new group called the Syrian Democratic Movement. It takes place in a cavernous cafe that I’m told is an historic haunt of the left. We walk past a classic scene of wizened old men playing cards and backgammon, and take our places in the room beyond. One man, who I subsequently learned has spent sixteen years in one of Assad’s dungeons, set the scene beautifully: “Comrades, we are living through a historic moment and we have a golden opportunity to shape our country’s future. Let’s work seriously”.
What follows is both familiar and extraordinary, as 55 people thrash out a program on which to build a progressive front to intervene in Syrian politics. There’s inevitably a bit of debate about secondary and semantic issues. But everyone is dead serious about trying to make this work and establishing the group on solid political foundations. There is broad consensus about emphasising women’s rights, opposing Israel’s occupation of Syrian land and working towards involving more youth in the movement. 
Abdullah, an older man who translated Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch into Arabic, pipes up about the need to add a section about Kurdish rights, given the ongoing attacks against them by Turkish-aligned militias. He gets some support, especially from the RLC, but it doesn’t seem unanimous. There’s a long history of chauvinism towards Kurds in Syria, and evidently there’s still work to be done on that front. 
If there was something missing from the conversation, it was a focus on economic grievances. Halla had warned me previously of the danger of the left being pigeonholed merely as spokespeople for minorities. “Of course we have to defend their rights, but we also need to speak in universal terms, to push economic demands that can appeal to workers from all religious groups”. Given that Human Rights Watch reported that over 90 percent of Syrians lived below the poverty line as of late 2023, I can’t help but agree.
Still, it is a wonderful experience to sit in a room with people experimenting with open democratic organising for the first time. There is something a bit magical about the golden light coming through the windows, the haze produced by the widespread chain-smoking, and the passion of comrades speaking their minds, constructing an important collective platform, out in the open, after 54 years of dictatorship. 
Tomorrow’s schedule of events includes a public meeting by the RLC arguing that removing the head of a regime is by no means enough to guarantee permanent, progressive change. In a totally different part of town, there’s a lecture being held on Syria’s economic future featuring well-known oppositionist intellectuals, and a documentary screening about the life and activism of Syrian dissident Yassin al Haj Saleh. And that’s just what I’ve gotten wind of. Presumably, there’s much more.
There will definitely be huge challenges and many debates ahead, but the left has well and truly entered the battle for Syria’s future.

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